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INTRODUCTION 
Forty years ago, the Supreme Court created what has become 
Secondary Effects Analysis.  It is a deferential type of review, 
established by the Court in the context of zoning regulations of 
sexually-oriented businesses,1 but now applied by lower courts to all 
types of regulations of sexually-oriented businesses.2  Erotic 
entertainment is expression protected by the Free Speech Clause of the 
First Amendment,3 and regulations targeting sexually-oriented 
businesses that sell it classify expression according to its content.4
Such facially content-sensitive government actions would ordinarily be 
highly suspect and subject to strict scrutiny review, whether they 
prohibited the speech entirely or only regulated the time, place, or 
manner of its delivery.5  According to Secondary Effects Analysis, 
however, a time, place, or manner regulation that targets sexually-
oriented businesses for regulation need only pass more deferential, 
“intermediate” scrutiny if its purpose is to reduce the negative 
“secondary” effects of erotic entertainment, rather than the “primary” 
or “direct” effects of the speech.6  When the government aims to reduce 
secondary effects it aims at something different from the content of the 
expression, according to the Court, because secondary effects are 
“unrelated to the impact of the speech on its audience”7 and “merely”8 
“happen to be associated with [a] type of speech.”9  In the Court’s 
words, such regulations are “completely consistent with [the] definition 
of ‘content-neutral’ speech regulations as those that ‘are justified 
1. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 434 (2002); City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 44, 47–48, 50-52 (1986); Young v. Am. Mini 
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976).  
2. See infra Part I.B.2.  – Mark Rienzi & Stuart Buck, Neutral No More: Secondary
Effects Analysis and the Quiet Demise of the Content-Neutrality Test, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1187, 1189 (“Modern commentary suggests most scholars agree that the secondary effects 
doctrine has been largely cabined to sexually-explicit speech.”).   
3. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000) (“Playboy's
programming has First Amendment protection”); City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 
289 (2000) (noting that “nude dancing of the type at issue here is expressive conduct, 
although we think that it falls only within the outer ambit of the First Amendment’s 
protection”) (citing Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1990) and Schad v. 
Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981)).  
4. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 811 (“The speech in question is defined by its content; and the
statute which seeks to restrict it is content based.”). 
5. Id. (citing Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).
6. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 434 (citing Renton, 475 U.S. at 46, 47–49, 50); id. at 
444, 448 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
7. Id. at 444 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
8. Id. at 438 (no high proof bar for municipalities that “want to address merely the
secondary effects of protected speech”). 
9. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988).
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without reference to the content of the regulated speech,’ ” and so “the 
[review] standards applicable to ‘content-neutral’ time, place, and 
manner regulations” apply.10 
 But despite the repeated assertions of the Court and individual 
Justices, it has never been clear how the “secondary effects” recited in 
the various Court opinions—such as crime, blight, and public health 
dangers—meet the description of “unrelated to the impact” of or 
“happen to be associated” with the content of the speech.  Many of 
these effects quite obviously trace to viewers’ reactions to the sexually-
stimulating content of the expression, which would condemn 
regulations aimed at other types of speech and at erotic expression 
outside the context of the operation of sexually-oriented businesses.11  
The Court has not faced up to this “link” between the content of the 
regulated expression and the “secondary effects” that render a content-
based regulation akin to content-neutral, nor has it explained how this 
link can exist consistent with constitutional principle.12  Following the 
Court’s lead, lower courts have gone through the motions of verifying 
that entry into Secondary Effects Analysis is appropriate, while 
skipping the question of how the “secondary effects” that fill the 
growing lists submitted by regulators meet the supposedly 
constitutionally crucial requirement that they be “unrelated to the 
impact of the speech on its audience.”13   
10. Renton, 475 U.S. at 48–49 (quoting Va. Pharm. Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)). 
11. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813–14 (2000) (applying
strict scrutiny to content-based FCC requirement to scramble the signals of channels 
showing adult content to prevent “signal bleed;” “[E]ven where speech is indecent and 
enters the home, the objective of shielding children does not suffice to support a blanket ban 
if the protection can be accomplished by a less restrictive alternative.”); Erznoznik v. City of 
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211–12, 213, 214–15 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny to a local 
ordinance that banned all films depicting nudity of any kind from being shown at a drive-in 
theater where the screen was visible from the street; ordinance was not justified based on 
offense to users of the public streets, protection of children, or potential distraction to 
motorists).  
12. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 437 (requiring that the city provide evidence to support
a link between concentrations of adult operation and secondary effects to justify its 
regulation but failing to acknowledge that the “correlation” with high crime rates traces to 
reactions of erotic entertainment patrons to the content of the speech); id. at 445 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (material inside adult bookstores and movie theaters is speech, but “the 
consequent sordidness outside is not”). 
13. Id. at 444 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Connie B. Cooper & Eric Damian Kelly, Tex.
City Attorneys Ass’n, Survey of Texas Appraisers: Secondary Effects of Sexually-Oriented 
Businesses on Market Values iii, iv (2008), 
https://www.tml.org/p/StudyofSecondaryEffectsCrime_Final.pdf. “Documenting 
measurable, negative secondary effects is the most practical and most widely accepted 
method of establishing such a purpose.  Courts once appeared to accept a mere recitation of 
negative secondary effects and later were willing to allow a community to rely on studies of 
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 Now, however, the Supreme Court has shot a missile into its own 
reasoning.  In Reed v. Town of Gilbert,14 the Court struck down a local 
ordinance that regulated the placement of signs depending upon the 
type of message sent.15  The Court of Appeals had determined the 
ordinance to be content neutral and subject to intermediate scrutiny 
review because “the Town ‘did not adopt its regulation of speech 
[based on] disagree[ment] with the message conveyed,’ and its 
justifications for regulating temporary directional signs were ‘unrelated 
to the content of the sign.’ ”16  The Court rejected this methodology and 
emphasized in seemingly absolute terms that if a regulation 
distinguishes speech according to content on its face, strict scrutiny 
review applies “regardless of the government's benign motive, content-
neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in 
the regulated speech.”17 
It could be that the six Justices in the Reed majority18 meant to 
sweep away four decades of precedent19 and subject the full range of 
detailed zoning, public health and safety regulations imposed by 
localities across the country on the operations of sexually-oriented 
businesses to the most demanding level of Free Speech Clause 
scrutiny.20  But this conclusion would ignore the Justices’ steadfast 
such effects from other communities; today, in the context of often-effective legal 
challenges by the sex industry, courts have raised their expectations. Today they expect 
more.” 
14. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
15. Id. at 2227 (“The Town's Sign Code . . . defines “Temporary Directional Signs” on
the basis of whether a sign conveys the message of directing the public to church or some 
other “qualifying event.” Glossary 25. It defines “Political Signs” on the basis of whether a 
sign's message is “designed to influence the outcome of an election.” Id. at 24. And it 
defines “Ideological Signs” on the basis of whether a sign “communicat [es] a message or 
ideas” that do not fit within the Code's other categories. Id. at 23. It then subjects each of 
these categories to different restrictions.”).  
16. Id. (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 707 F.3d 1057, 1071–72 (9th Cir. 2013)), and
noting that “[i]n its brief to this Court, the United States similarly contends that a sign 
regulation is content neutral—even if it expressly draws distinctions based on the sign's 
communicative content—if those distinctions can be “ ‘justified without reference to the 
content of the regulated speech.’ ” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20, 24 (quoting 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746). (emphasis deleted).  
17. Id. at 2228.
18. Justice Thomas wrote the Court’s opinion, joined by Justices Roberts, Scalia,
Kennedy, Alito and Sotomayor.  Justices Breyer, Ginsberg and Kagan concurred in the 
judgment. 
19. RCP Publ’ns Inc. v. City of Chi., No. 15 C 11398, 2016 WL 4593830, at *4 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 2, 2016) (agreeing with another district court “that Reed does not overrule decades 
of jurisprudence regarding commercial speech.”).  
20. Minch Minchin, A Doctrine at Risk: Content Neutrality in a Post-Reed Landscape,
22 COMM. L. & POL'Y 123 (2017) (suggesting that the Court “minimize[], if not eradicate[]” 
secondary effects doctrine in light of Reed);  Eugene Volokh, Supreme Court Reaffirms 
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cultivation, development, and embrace of Secondary Effects Analysis, 
in the face of persistent and persuasive external21 and internal22 
criticism over many years.  At last count, albeit fifteen years ago, all 
nine Justices considering the matter confirmed that it, or some other 
sort of deferential review of some class of erotic entertainment 
regulations, was here to stay.23  Far more likely than the conclusion that 
the Reed Court implicitly repealed its secondary effects precedents, is 
the conclusion that its failure to mention or cite them24 implicitly 
validated their fundamental premise—that some difference of 
constitutional significance distinguishes “content-correlated” 
regulations aimed at reducing the “secondary effects” of sexually-
oriented businesses25 from laws that “appl[y] to particular speech 
Broad Prohibition on Content-Based Speech Restrictions, in Today's Reed v. Town of 
Gilbert Decision, WASH. POST, June 18, 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/18/supreme-court-
reaffirms-broad-prohibition-on-content-based-speech-restrictions-in-todays-reed-v-town-of-
gilbert-decision/ (noting a “conflict between the logic of Reed and the logic of the secondary 
effects precedents”). 
21. See, e.g., Mark Rienzi & Stuart Buck, Neutral No More: Secondary Effects
Analysis and the Quiet Demise of the Content-Neutrality Test, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1187, 
1200–01 (2013); David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary-Effects Doctrine: Stripping Away 
First Amendment Freedoms, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 19, 29 (2012); Daniel R. Aaronson, 
Gary S. Edinger & James S. Benjamin, The First Amendment in Chaos: How the Law of 
Secondary Effects is Applied and Misapplied by the Circuit Courts, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
741, 743 (2009); Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Stripping Away First Amendment 
Rights: The Legislative Assault on Sexually Oriented Businesses, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL’Y 287, 325–26 (2003–2004); Amy Adler, Girls!  Girls!  Girls!: The Supreme Court 
Confronts the G-String, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1108, 1118–23 (2005); but see John Fee, The 
Pornographic Secondary Effects Doctrine, 60 ALA. L. REV. 291 (2009).  
22. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 52 (1986) (Brennan, J., joined by
Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Renton's zoning ordinance selectively imposes limitations on the 
location of a movie theater based exclusively on the content of the films shown there. The 
constitutionality of the ordinance is therefore not correctly analyzed under standards applied 
to content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions”); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 
427 U.S. 50, 84 (1976) (Stewart, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, dissenting) 
(“The Court today holds that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not prevent the city 
of Detroit from using a system of prior restraints and criminal sanctions to enforce content-
based restrictions on the geographic location of motion picture theaters that exhibit 
nonobscene but sexually-oriented films. I dissent from this drastic departure from 
established principles of First Amendment law.”). 
23. In Alameda Books, all nine justices joined opinions applying secondary effects
analysis.  City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 436–42 (2002) (O’Connor, J., 
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and Thomas, J.J., for the plurality), 444–52 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring); 453–66 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens and Ginsburg, J.J., dissenting).  
24. The majority opinion failed to respond to the concurring Justices’ contention that
“Our cases have been far less rigid than the majority admits,” accompanied by examples 
including citation to secondary effects precedent.  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 
2238 (2015) (Kagan, J., concurring) (citing Renton, 475 U.S. at 41).   
25. Some lower courts have cited the Court’s secondary effects precedents and
purported to apply secondary effects analysis outside the context of sexually-oriented 
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because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.”26  
This Article is the first to reevaluate the potential grounding and 
principled justification for this entrenched doctrinal anomaly in light of 
the Court’s strong statements in Reed.  Critics concerned that 
Secondary Effects Analysis leaves open the possibility of pretextual 
justifications for regulations of sexually-oriented businesses may never 
be satisfied, and perhaps they should not be.27  But this Article is not 
primarily about application of Secondary Effects Analysis.  It is about 
the justification for the move into Secondary Effects Analysis in the 
first place.  Regulators that must continue to make and enforce land-use 
businesses.  For the most part, and to the extent it is apparent from the opinions, the 
“secondary effects” that exist in these contexts are truly secondary, like the effects of a time, 
place or manner regulation, in that they are not caused in part by listeners’ reactions to the 
content of the expression.  Church v. City of St. Michael, Civil No. 15-1575 (DWF/JSM), 
2016 WL 4545310, at *4 (D. Minn. Aug. 31, 2016) (church produced secondary effects of 
traffic caused by a single, large service and  lack of “retail synergy”); Yvon v. City of 
Oceanside, Case No. 16-CV-1640-AJB-WVG, 2016 WL 4238539, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 
2016) (“[T]he City has proffered says nothing that ties tattooing itself to the secondary 
effects that the City seeks to avoid.”); New York Youth Club v. Town of Harrison, 150 
F.Supp.3d 264, 272 (S.D. N.Y. 2015) (citing secondary effects precedents in reviewing a
door-to-door solicitor licensing requirement that did not distinguish according to the content
of speech).
26. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2231; BBL, Inc. v. City of Angola, 809 F.3d 317, 326 n.1 (7th
Cir. 2015) (“We don't think Reed upends established doctrine for evaluating regulation of 
businesses that offer sexually explicit entertainment, a category the Court has said occupies 
the outer fringes of First Amendment protection.”); City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 
277, 292 (2000) (plurality opinion); Brian J. Connolly & Alan C. Weinstein, Sign 
Regulation After Reed: Suggestions for Coping with Legal Uncertainty, 47 THE URB. LAW. 
569 at 601 (2015) (reviewing the stances of the current Justices and concluding that “only 
Justice Thomas is likely interested in overturning the secondary effects doctrine since the 
doctrine raises concerns about the risk of censorship identical to those he noted in Reed.”); 
Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 514 (4th Cir. 2002) (explaining that in the 
“limited context” of time, place or manner restrictions imposed on sexually-oriented 
businesses, “the Supreme Court does not equate reference to content with the suppression of 
content”).  But see Kyle Langvardt, The Doctrinal Toll of “Information as Speech,” Loy. U. 
Chi. L.J. (2016) (“[T]he Supreme Court has indicated in its 2015 decision in Reed v. Gilbert 
that secondary effects arguments are no longer valid.”); Marc O. DeGirolami, Virtue, 
Freedom, and the First Amendment, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1465, 1477 n.54 (“The Court 
cast considerable doubt on the continuing vitality of the “secondary effects” test.”). 
27. See, e.g., David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary-Effects Doctrine: Stripping Away
First Amendment Freedoms, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 19, 29 (2012) (“In an ideal world, 
the secondary-effects distortion of First Amendment law should be abandoned.”); Daniel R. 
Aaronson, Gary S. Edinger & James S. Benjamin, The First Amendment in Chaos: How the 
Law of Secondary Effects is Applied and Misapplied by the Circuit Courts, 63 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 741, 758 (2009) (“The lack of clarity from the Supreme Court on these issues has led 
to a point where there appears to be little or no scrutiny given to whether an articulated 
governmental problem can truly be tied to “adult” entertainment and where, irrespective of 
the Supreme Court's comments in Pap's and Alameda Books, there really is little ability to 
challenge the mere pretext assertion of the governmental interest of adverse secondary 
effects.”).  
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rules, and courts that must continue to resolve challenges to them after 
the Court’s decision in Reed, must base their analyses on a more robust 
understanding than what currently exists of the characteristics of 
“secondary” effects that justify application of less-than-strict scrutiny 
review to regulations that quite obviously classify speech by its 
content.  Although the Court has never undertaken the task, it is 
possible to tighten and focus the prerequisites for entry into the 
analysis by identifying the attributes of the effects that it has accepted 
as “secondary” and understanding why those attributes may support a 
principled departure from strict review.  Regulators and courts urgently 
need this understanding to explain their continuing embrace and guide 
their applications of Secondary Effects Analysis after the Court’s 
decision in Reed.   
 Part I briefly describes the genesis of the concept of “secondary 
effects” and the application of Secondary Effects Analysis.  Part II 
reviews the possible simple definitions of secondary effects that lead to 
deferential scrutiny.  Although some causal connection between the 
content of erotic speech and the secondary effects that justify 
regulation must exist, this Part explains that “secondary” effects can 
plausibly be divorced from listener offense at the content of the speech.  
This recognition begins the process of identifying the attributes of 
“secondary effects,” which can support a constitutionally principled 
move into deferential Secondary Effects Analysis.  Part III sets out 
these attributes and explains them.  Secondary effects are the 
foreseeable, likely and immediate result of the operation of businesses 
that make money selling speech aimed at producing sexual stimulation. 
They are caused in part by the responses of speakers or willing listeners 
to the speech content, but are also caused by the means of operation 
modified by the regulation.  The latter cause must appear on the face of 
the regulation to be its exclusive target, rather than the content of the 
speech.  This modified understanding of secondary effects is not 
simple, but neither is it unworkable.  Instead, it provides principle and 
structure to the important inquiry into whether departure from the strict 
scrutiny that usually applies to regulations that distinguish speech 
according to its content is justified.    
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I. A SHORT HISTORY OF SECONDARY EFFECTS ANALYSIS
A. The Genesis of “Secondary Effects”
Secondary Effects Analysis began in Young v. Am. Mini Theatres,
Inc.,28 in which a majority of the Court upheld a Detroit zoning 
ordinance identifying adult movie theaters according to the content of 
the films they sold and restricting them to certain parts of the city.29  
Young posed a quandary for the Justices in the majority.  A number of 
strains of free speech doctrine, which had just recently solidified, 
seemed to indicate that a regulation, such as the Detroit ordinance, 
which classifies speech according to its content could be valid only if it 
survived strict judicial scrutiny. 
One strain of doctrine defines the limited circumstances in which 
offense to public sensibilities, or more generally, public morals, can be 
used as the basis for restricting speech according to its content.  Just 
three years prior to the Young decision, the Court had finally coalesced 
in Miller v. California30 to articulate the definition of “obscenity,” the 
legal term of art for sex speech that regulators can prohibit entirely. 
The Miller test identifies obscenity by three factors that relate to its 
content.31  The Court’s affirmation of the unprotected “obscenity” 
category of speech is notable because it preserved the ability of 
government regulators to criminalize speech on a ground no more 
compelling than that its content undermines public morals.  At the 
same time, the articulation of this limited category of unprotected sex 
speech seemingly liberated any sex speech that does not meet all three 
prongs of the Miller test from restriction absent a government interest 
more compelling than upholding public morality and a showing that no 
alternate means to achieve the government interest are available.32  
Cases decided as the Court’s definition of unprotected obscenity was 
developing confirmed that absent special circumstances, public offense 
is not a sufficient justification to restrict the use of bad words,33 
28. Young v. Am. Mimi. Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
29. Id. at 52–55. 
30. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
31. Id. at 24 (to be obscene, the speech must (a) appeal to the prurient interest, as
determined by the average person, applying contemporary community standards; (b) depict 
or describe, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
applicable state law; and (c) when taken as a whole, lack serious literary, artistic, political, 
or scientific value). 
32. United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811–13, 815 (2000)
(subjecting restriction of pornography that is not obscene to strict scrutiny). 
33. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18–21 (1971) (arrest of protester for wearing
jacket bearing the words “Fuck the Draft” could not be justified on basis of offense to 
unwilling observers, as words were not directed at an individual and were not designed to 
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nudity,34 or sex scenes in books or films that do not meet the limited 
definition of obscenity.35 
Another strain of doctrine identifies the extent to which the 
potential persuasive force of the content of speech can justify 
restrictions of it.  In Brandenburg v. Ohio,36 the Court came together to 
define incitement, which the government may prohibit entirely because 
it may persuade listeners to engage in bad behavior.  The incitement 
category protects advocacy of dangerous ideas unless bad conduct is 
likely, imminent, and intended to be provoked by the speaker.37  The 
test protects entertainment vendors and others from liability for various 
types of copy-cat behaviors38 and protects positive portrayals of sexual 
behaviors that a majority of the public may consider immoral.39 
A third strain of doctrine established that content-based speech 
distinctions pose the core danger of government censorship even if they 
result in only partial, time, place, or manner restrictions and not a total 
prohibition of the message.  In Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley,40 the 
Court relied on the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate an ordinance 
that allowed only labor-related picketing around schools during certain 
hours.  In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,41 the Court relied on the 
free speech right to invalidate a regulation that required drive-in movie 
theater to shield films with nudity from view from the street.  Both 
cases emphasized that “ ‘[a]bove all else, the First Amendment means 
that government has no power to restrict expression because of its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.’ ”42  
The Court inaugurated what has become Secondary Effects 
incite violence). 
34. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974) (mainstream film, “Carnal
Knowledge,” is not obscene and cannot be restricted because it offends public morality). 
35. Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488, 502–03 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)
(Lady Chatterley’s Lover not obscene and ban on distribution lifted); Moreover, exceptions 
are intrusions into the home, FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 (1978) (radio 
broadcast); Rowan v. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738–39 (1970) (pandering 
advertisements sent through the mail); or limiting access by minors, Ginsberg v. N.Y. 390 
U.S. 629, 634–37 (1968) (magazines could be considered nonobscene for adults but obscene 
for minors, and thus the state could restrict their sale to those under 17). 
36. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
37. Id. at 447 n.2.
38. See, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 802, 803–05 (S.D. Tex.
1983) (suicide provoked by Hustler piece on auto-erotic asphyxiation); Walt Disney Prods., 
Inc. v. Shannon, 276 S.E.2d 580, 582–83, 583 n.3 (1981) (injury by child copying gun trick 
on The Mickey Mouse Club). 
39. Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 688–89
(1959). 
40. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94–95 (1972).
41. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211–12 (1975).
42. Id. at 215 (quoting Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95).
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Analysis just a year after its decision in Erznoznik.  In Young, the Court 
reviewed amendments to Detroit’s Anti-Skid Row Ordinance, which 
had been adopted by the city ten years earlier.  The original ordinance 
required that certain types of businesses disperse and prohibited them 
from being located within 500 feet of residential areas.43  In enacting 
the ordinance and identifying businesses subject to it, the city council 
relied on findings that some land uses “because of their very nature, are 
recognized as having serious objectionable operational characteristics, 
particularly when several of them are concentrated under certain 
circumstances thereby having a deleterious effect upon the adjacent 
areas.”44 The 1972 amendments added adult businesses, including 
movie theaters, to the list of covered uses.  The number of such 
businesses had jumped significantly in the previous five years.45 The 
“deleterious effect[s] upon the adjacent areas” of congregating adult 
businesses were that such a concentration “tends to attract an 
undesirable quantity and quality of transients, adversely affects 
property values, causes an increase in crime, especially prostitution, 
and encourages residents and businesses to move elsewhere.”46  
The Young plurality acknowledged the “principal question” that it 
faced: “whether the statutory classification [which differentiates 
between motion picture theaters which exhibit sexually explicit “adult” 
movies and those which do not] is unconstitutional because it is based 
on the content of the communication protected by the First 
Amendment.”47  The Court of Appeals majority had viewed the Mosley 
decision as controlling, and had held the Detroit zoning ordinance to be 
the same type of content-based time, place, or manner restriction on 
fully protected speech, which violates the Constitution unless it can 
survive strict judicial scrutiny.48  The four dissenting Justices in Young 
agreed.  They viewed Detroit’s efforts to reduce the “distasteful 
effects” of adult theaters through zoning to be no different from other 
efforts by other regulators, such as the City of Jacksonville in 
43. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 52 (1976).
44. Id. at 54 n.6; see also Am. Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F. 2d 1014 (6th Cir.
1975) (Celebrezze, J., dissenting) (the uses covered by the original Ordinance were “bars, 
hotels, pawnshops, billiard halls, secondhand stores, taxi dance halls, and other 
establishments which in proximity to each other gave areas a “skid row” appearance and 
thereby contributed to the decline of nearby residential communities”). 
45. Young, 427 U.S. at 54–55, 55 n.8 (number of adult theaters jumped from two to 25,
and other adult businesses experienced “a comparable increase”). 
46. Id. at 54 n.6, 55.
47. Id. at 52.
48. Gribbs, 518 F.2d at 1020–21 (rev’d sub nom. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc.,
427 U.S. 50 (1976)). 
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Erznoznik, to protect members of the public from “offensive” speech.49  
In the dissent’s view, applying less than strict scrutiny to review the 
Detroit ordinance represented a “drastic departure from established 
principles of First Amendment law.”50 
 The Justices in the Young majority51 viewed the paradigm 
presented by the Detroit zoning ordinance differently, and refused to 
“mechanically apply the doctrines developed in other contexts.”52  
They identified features of the regulation which, in their views, 
removed the suspicion of unconstitutional message censorship that the 
content distinction would otherwise arouse.  One feature crucial to the 
constitutional validity of the Detroit ordinance, and to any other 
regulation to which secondary effects are relevant, is that it qualifies as 
a time, place, or manner restriction and does not result in the “total 
suppression” of a type of erotic speech.53  But this feature, while 
necessary, is not sufficient to distinguish regulations such as the Detroit 
ordinance from content-based time, place, or manner regulations that 
are properly subject to strict scrutiny.  It is the “secondary” nature of 
the “distasteful effects” that the regulator seeks to avoid that does this 
work.  Although Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, merely 
mentioned the term in a footnote,54 the concept has blossomed into the 
defining attribute that moves facially “content-based” regulations from 
strict scrutiny into deferential “intermediate” level review. 
In fact, the roots of the secondary effects concept trace to Judge 
Anthony Celebrezze’s opinion dissenting from the Court of Appeals’ 
conclusion that the Detroit ordinance violated the Constitution because 
it classified films and printed materials on the basis of their content.55  
Both the majority and dissenting opinions located the key question as 
to the constitutionality of the Detroit ordinance in the third prong of the 
expressive conduct test set out in United States v. O’Brien.56  This 
prong requires that a regulation be “unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression” to escape strict scrutiny.57  In Judge Celebrezze’s view, the 
49. Young, 427 U.S. at 84–85, 87–8 (Stewart, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun, J.J., dissenting) (citing Erzoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)). 
50. Id. at 84.
51. Id. at 52, 73 (Justice Stevens wrote the plurality opinion for four Justices and
Justice Powell concurred). 
52. Id. at 76 (Powell, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 70 (majority opinion).
54. Id. at 71 n.34.
55. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014, 1023 (6th Cir. 1975)
(Celebrezze, J., dissenting). 
56. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
57. Under the O’Brien test, a government regulation that restricts expressive conduct is
constitutional if: (1) it is within the constitutional power of government, (2) it furthers an 
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Detroit ordinance met this requirement.  Rather than being “a 
regulation of speech on the basis of its content,” the ordinance was 
properly characterized as “a regulation of the right to locate a business 
based on the side-effects of its location.”58  Lesser judicial scrutiny is 
appropriate because “[t]he interest in preserving neighborhoods [by 
reducing side-effects] is not a subterfuge for censorship.”59  Judge 
Celebrezze distinguished Mosley, on which the circuit court majority 
had relied, by noting that “a justifiable distinction in neighborhood 
impact [] underlies the differential treatment between adult and non-
adult businesses” in the Detroit ordinance, whereas in Mosley, “the 
City was unable to justify a differential treatment of peaceful labor 
picketing and peaceful non-labor picketing.”60  He noted that the 
concentration prohibition did not significantly affect publishers or 
consumers of adult materials.61  Rather, it diminished the profits of 
businessmen who sought to gain the advantage of locating near other 
such businesses, which was not of constitutional concern.62  Judge 
Celebrezze rejected the notion that the Constitution requires cities like 
Detroit to zone all businesses offering the same type of speech product 
evenhandedly.63  In his view, the record in the case “belie[d] th[e] 
conclusion [that adult and non-adult bookstores and theaters pose 
similar threats to the stability of neighborhoods]” and instead 
“establishe[d] the legitimate reasons for treating adult establishments in 
the same manner as pool rooms and bars, without treating non-adult 
theaters and bookstores similarly.”64 
In upholding the partial restrictions of the Detroit ordinance, the 
Young plurality relied significantly on a judgment that the Constitution 
does not protect sexually explicit speech as fully as it protects other 
types of speech.65  Justice Powell, the fifth vote to form the majority, 
did not agree.66  The point of intersection among the members of the 
majority was the determination that Detroit’s purpose to reduce the 
important or substantial governmental interest, (3) that interest is unrelated to the 
suppression of speech, and (4) the restriction it incidentally imposes on speech is no greater 
than necessary to further that interest. Id. at 377. 
58. Gribbs, 518 F.2d at 1023 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1024 (citing Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)).
61. Id. at 1025 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014, 1025 (6th Cir. 1975).
65. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70–71 (1976). 
66. Id. at 73 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring) (disagreeing that “nonobscene, erotic
[expression] may be treated differently under First Amendment principles from other forms 
of protected expression.”). 
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secondary effects of adult businesses removed the ordinance from strict 
judicial review.  Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, noted that the 
Detroit zoning ordinance was directed at avoiding the effect of the area 
surrounding adult movie theaters “deteriorat[ing] and becom[ing] a 
focus of crime” and not at “the dissemination of ‘offensive’ speech.”67  
He contrasted the regulation in Erznoznik by noting that requiring 
theaters to screen away nude scenes was aimed primarily at “protecting 
. . .  citizens from exposure to unwanted, ‘offensive’ speech,” not at 
reducing negative secondary effects of the speech.68  In Justice 
Powell’s words, comparison of the Detroit ordinance to invalid 
content-based time, place, and manner restrictions was inapposite 
because adult movie theaters, as compared to non-adult movie theaters, 
“have markedly different effects upon their surroundings.”69  He 
distinguished the ordinance in Erznoznik as a “misconceived attempt 
directly to regulate content of expression.”70  By contrast, the Detroit 
zoning ordinance “affect[ed] expression only incidentally and in 
furtherance of governmental interests wholly unrelated to the 
regulation of expression.”71  Justice Powell acknowledged that “courts 
must be alert to the possibility of direct rather than incidental effect of 
zoning on expression, and especially to the possibility of using the 
power to zone as a pretext for suppressing expression,” but “it is clear 
that this is not such a case.72   
In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,73 a majority of the 
Court upheld another zoning ordinance that limited the places where 
adult movie theaters could be located.  The Court distinguished 
content-based time, place, and manner restrictions “enacted for the 
purpose of restraining speech on the basis of content,” which are 
subject to strict scrutiny, from “so-called ‘content-neutral’ time, place 
and manner regulations” that must only undergo a form of intermediate 
scrutiny.74  The Court held that the zoning ordinance before it, like the 
67. Id. at 71 n.34.
68. Id. (“The only secondary effect relied upon to support [the] ordinance was the
impact on traffic–an effect which might be caused by a distracting open-air movie even if it 
did not exhibit nudity.”) (citing Erzoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214–15 (1972)) The 
Court in Erzoznik, noted that the traffic regulation justification was raised for the first time 
in oral argument, and had no support in the record or in the text of the ordinance. Erzoznik, 
422 U.S. at 214. 
69. Young, 427 U.S. at 82 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 84.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
74. Id. at 46–47 (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984); Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 807 (1984); 
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one in Young, was properly subject to more deferential review because 
it was “aimed not at the content of the films,” but rather “at the 
secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community.”75  In 
response to a claim by the erotic entertainment business that some 
members of the regulating body had aimed to restrict the sex speech 
because it was offensive, the Court held that the City Council’s 
predominate intent was controlling.76  In reiterating the district court’s 
finding of the regulator’s predominate intent, the Court recited various 
“effects” that, in its view, qualified as “secondary.”77  According to the 
Court, the regulation was appropriately designed to “prevent crime, 
protect the city’s retail trade, maintain property values, and generally 
‘protec[t] and preserv[e] the quality of [the city’s] neighborhoods, 
commercial districts, and the quality of urban life.’ ”78  It adopted what 
it characterized as Young’s holding, “that, at least with respect to 
businesses that purvey sexually explicit materials, zoning ordinances 
designed to combat the undesirable secondary effects of such 
businesses are to be reviewed under the standards applicable to 
‘content-neutral’ time, place, and manner regulations.”79  Although 
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall in dissent, did not credit 
the city’s “post hoc statements” that the ordinance was aimed at 
reducing secondary effects, he acknowledged the distinction between 
“secondary” effects and effects more closely tied to the content of 
expression.80  While the adverse effects of pornography on children, 
spouses, and community standards of morality were, in his view, 
synonymous with public offense at the content of adult films, 
“increased levels of criminal activities, including prostitution, rape, 
incest and assaults in the vicinity of [] adult entertainment land uses” 
were appropriately classified as “secondary” effects.81  
In two subsequent cases involving challenges to local nudity bans 
applied to erotic dancing, the Justices discussed the secondary effects 
concept and rationale.  In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,82 a majority of 
Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647–48 (1981)). 
75. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47.
76. Id. at 47–48.
77. Id. at 4748, 50–51.
78. Id. at 48 (citing Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 472 U.S. 50, 70, 71 n.34, 72–73
(1976)). 
79. Id. at 49.
80. Id. at 59–60 & nn.3 & 4 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that Renton had not
amended its ordinance to add findings related to secondary effects until after the lawsuit was 
commenced; prior to the amendment, the ordinance had not indicated it was designed to 
address any secondary effects of adult theaters).  
81. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 59–60 & nn.3 & 4 (1986).
82. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
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Justices upheld a public nudity restriction applied to require erotic 
dancers to wear at least pasties and a G-string.  Finding that the public 
nudity ban incidentally limited expressive activity, a plurality of three 
Justices applied the O’Brien test and found the state’s interest in 
“protecting societal order and morality” by prohibiting all types of 
public nudity to be substantial.83  It found that interest to be “unrelated 
to the suppression of free expression” because the state sought to 
address the “perceived evil” of public nudity in any public place for 
any reason, not only nude dancing.84 
Justice Souter concurred, writing separately to rely on “the State’s 
substantial interest in combating . . . secondary effects.”85  In his view, 
the city’s interest in “preventing prostitution, sexual assault, and other 
criminal activity” was “unrelated to the suppression of free expression” 
as required by the third prong of the O’Brien test.86  He responded to 
the dissent’s claim that this interest was, in fact, related to suppressing 
the expression, and the regulation should be subject to strict scrutiny, 
because the crimes the city sought to remedy were caused by viewers 
reacting to the erotic content of the nude dancing.87  He agreed that 
“regulation of expressive conduct because of the fear that the 
expression will prove persuasive is inherently related to the 
suppression of free expression.”88  He disagreed, however, that the 
“pernicious secondary effects” of nude dancing were necessarily 
caused by the persuasive effect of the expression.89  Rather, the cause 
could be “the concentration of crowds of men predisposed to such 
activities” or the stimulating effect of viewing nude bodies without 
respect to the expression.90  This would mean that the speech and 
effects were correlated, but the effects would be appropriately 
classified as “secondary” because they were not necessarily the result 
of viewers’ reactions to the content of the speech.91 
In City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.,92 a majority of Justices upheld a 
83. Id. at 567–68, 569 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
84. Id. at 570, 571.
85. Id. at 582 (Souter, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 583, 585 (citing O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
87. Id. at 560, 585–86 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring) (citing id. at 592 (White, J.,
dissenting)). 
88. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 585 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring)
(citing id. at 592 (White, J., dissenting)).  
89. Id. at 585–86 (Souter, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 586.
91. Id. (drawing a distinction between the state’s interest arising from a simple
correlation between nude dancing and “other evils” rather than “from a relationship between 
the other evils and the expressive component of the dancing”). 
92. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277. 278 (2000).
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“general prohibition on public nudity” that was “almost identical” to 
the statute in Barnes.93  Under one line of reasoning, the plurality found 
the fact that the ordinance on its face was a content-neutral restriction 
on conduct led directly into O’Brien’s mid-level scrutiny.94  Evidence 
in the record, however, indicated that the city council had aimed 
particularly at the expressive activity of nude dancing, rather than 
“[b]eing ‘in a state of nudity’ ”  generally.95  So, under an alternate line 
of reasoning, the plurality found that the regulation was still properly 
evaluated as a content-neutral restriction because its purpose was to 
reduce the negative secondary effects of nude dancing.96  The plurality 
distinguished the city’s legitimate purpose to reduce “secondary” 
effects such as “crime” and other “impacts on public health, safety and 
welfare” caused by the presence of adult entertainment 
establishments97 from what would be an illegitimate purpose to 
regulate speech because of its “primary” effects, meaning “the effect 
on the audience of watching nude erotic dancing.”98  Justice Stevens, 
joined by Justice Ginsburg, criticized the Court for improperly 
extending Secondary Effects Analysis beyond regulations of the place 
where expression may occur—zoning—to restrictions on the means of 
expression—totally nude dancing—that apply everywhere within the 
regulating jurisdiction.99  The dissent characterized this effect as a 
“total suppression of protected speech” that no longer qualified for 
deferential intermediate scrutiny.100  Although the dissenters disagreed 
with the plurality’s use of Secondary Effects Analysis, they agreed 
with the distinction between the two types of effects.  According to the 
93. Id. at 289–90.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 289, 290–91 (being in a state of nudity “is not an inherently expressive
condition”). 
96. Id. at 297.
97. Id. at 290 (The preamble to the ordinance stated the negative effects to include
“provid[ing] an atmosphere conducive to violence, sexual harassment, public intoxication, 
prostitution, [and] the spread of sexually transmitted diseases” (quoting Pap’s A.M. v. City 
of Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 279 (Pa. 1998)); see also id. at 297 (“[C]ertain lewd, immoral 
activities carried on in public places for profit are highly detrimental to public health, safety 
and welfare, and lead to the debasement of both women and men, promote violence, public 
intoxication, prostitution and other serious criminal activity.”).  
98. Id. at 291.
99. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 317–18 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“Until now, the ‘secondary effects’ of commercial enterprises featuring indecent 
entertainment have justified only the regulation of their location. For the first time, the Court 
has now held that such effects may justify the total suppression of protected speech. Indeed, 
the plurality opinion concludes that admittedly trivial advancements of a State's interests 
may provide the basis for censorship.”). 
100. Id. at 317–318, 322 n.5 (quoting Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70
(1976)). 
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dissent, “A secondary effect on the neighborhood that ‘happen[s] to be 
associated with’ a form of speech is, of course, critically different from 
‘the direct impact of speech on its audience.’ . . . The primary effect of 
speech is the persuasive effect of the message itself.”101 
The Pap’s A.M. dissent quoted Boos v. Barry,102 which addressed 
a Washington, D.C. regulation that prohibited displaying signs critical 
of a government outside its embassy.  In that case, the Court 
distinguished the “secondary effects” relied upon by erotic 
entertainment regulators from the “effect” of interfering with the 
dignity of foreign officials, which the D.C. regulation sought to avoid, 
and which the Court characterized as primary.103  According to the 
Court, “the desire to suppress crime” outside of adult movie theaters is 
a purpose to reduce secondary effects because it “has nothing to do 
with the actual films being shown inside.”104  By contrast, “if the 
ordinance [] was justified by the city's desire to prevent the 
psychological damage it felt was associated with viewing adult movies, 
then . . . [t]he hypothetical regulation [would] target[] the direct impact 
of a particular category of speech, not a secondary feature that happens 
to be associated with that type of speech.”105  Similarly, according to 
the Court, defenders of the D.C. ordinance did not point to “secondary 
effects” of picket signs in front of embassies, such as “congestion, [] 
interference with ingress or egress, [] visual clutter, or [interference 
with] the security of embassies.”106  Rather, they relied upon the need 
to avoid “[t]he emotive impact of speech on its audience,” which is a 
“primary impact.”107  For this reason, the Court applied strict scrutiny 
instead of the more deferential Secondary Effects Analysis.108 
In other cases following Renton, reviewing regulations imposed 
on the sale of sex speech, the Court declined to rely on secondary 
effects to lower the level of scrutiny.  In Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. 
v. FCC,109 the Court applied strict scrutiny to invalidate what it
characterized as a “total ban” on interstate transmission of indecent
telephone messages for pay.  The Court confirmed that “[s]exual
expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First
101. Id. at 324 n.6 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1988)).
102. Boos, 485 U.S. at 312.
103. Id. at 320, 321.
104. Id. at 320.
105. Id. at 321.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320, 321 (1988)).
109. Sable Commc’ns of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
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Amendment.”110  The government’s purpose was to protect children 
from the influence of the erotic messages.  Although the Court found 
the interest compelling, it found the total ban insufficiently tailored to 
protect adult access to protected speech.111  In Reno v. ACLU,112 the 
Court specifically rejected the government’s claim that Internet access 
restrictions should be subject to less than strict scrutiny because they 
were aimed at reducing negative secondary effects.  The Court viewed 
the purpose of the restrictions to be “to protect children from the 
primary effects of “indecent” and “patently offensive” speech, rather 
than any “secondary” effect of such speech.”113  Similarly, the Court in 
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp.,114 refused to apply Secondary 
Effects Analysis to a statute that required television stations offering 
erotic entertainment to scramble their programs or limit broadcasts to 
certain hours.  The Court found it of no consequence that the regulation 
limited only the time, place, or manner of broadcast because “the 
overriding justification for the regulation is concern for the effect of the 
subject matter on young viewers,” which is not a secondary effect.115  
Instead, the regulation “focuse[d] only on the content of the speech and 
the direct impact that speech has on its listeners,” which “is the essence 
of content-based regulation.”116 
A fifth case provides the last word from the Supreme Court on the 
features that qualify a regulation for deferential Secondary Effects 
Analysis.  In City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.,117 all nine 
Justices agreed that no greater than mid-level Secondary Effects 
Analysis applied to a city zoning ordinance that dispersed adult 
businesses.118  The plurality drew from Renton the steps leading into 
110. Id. at 126.
111. Id. at 126–27, 130–31.
112. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
113. Id. at 868.  The Court also viewed the statute as imposing a “blanket” restriction
that applied to the entire Internet, and not as a type of time, place, or manner regulation. 
114. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
115. Id. at 811.
116. Id. at 811-12.
117. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002).
118. Id. at 438–39, 441 (plurality) (noting that none of the parties requested to depart
from the Renton framework); id. at 443–44 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the 
plurality’s analysis constituted a correct application of secondary effects analysis, but he 
would interpret the Constitution to provide no protection to the “business of pandering 
sex”); id. at 444–45, 447 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that the secondary effects test 
was the appropriate one; however, he agreed with the dissent that the test was imprecise and 
disagreed with the plurality’s “subtle expansion” of Renton); id. at 454–55, 456, 458 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (characterizing the “variants of middle-tier tests” of intermediate 
scrutiny applied to adult entertainment zoning regulations as covering “a grab bag of 
restrictive statutes, with a corresponding variety of justifications”; while he would apply the 
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Secondary Effects Analysis.119  First, a court must determine that the 
regulation is appropriately characterized as a time, place, and manner 
regulation and not a complete ban on the mode of entertainment.120  
Next, the court must verify that the regulation is appropriately 
characterized as “content neutral” because it aims to reduce negative 
secondary effects.121   
   Justice Kennedy concurred.  He disagreed with the plurality’s 
terminology.122  Like the dissent, he thought that the proper label for 
laws like the one at issue was “content-based,” but agreed with the 
plurality that the appropriate analysis was deferential scrutiny so long 
as the regulation was aimed at reducing negative secondary effects.123  
Justice Kennedy began his concurrence by distinguishing between the 
primary effects of speech—“chang[ing] minds” and prompt[ing] 
actions” —and secondary effects, which are “unrelated to the impact of 
the speech on its audience.”124  As examples of “secondary effects” 
produced by speech, he noted that a newspaper factory may cause 
pollution or a billboard may obstruct a view, and zoning laws may 
address these effects even though they are produced by speech.   
Justice Kennedy agreed with the two requirements to enter 
Secondary Effects Analysis set out by the plurality—that the regulation 
must qualify as a time, place, or manner restriction and that it must be 
aimed at reducing secondary effects.  His point in writing separately 
was to qualify further the “proposition” that a regulator must advance, 
at the outset, for an ordinance to be subject to Secondary Effects 
Analysis.125  According to Justice Kennedy, “The rationale of the 
ordinance must be that it will suppress secondary effects—and not by 
suppressing speech.”126  This means that by operation of the regulation 
“the quantity of speech will be substantially undiminished, and that 
total secondary effects will be significantly reduced.”127  He contrasted 
intermediate-scrutiny test, he would require Los Angeles to produce empirical justification 
for the regulation rather than relying on a two-decade-old study). 
119. Id. at 433–34 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46,
47–49, 50, 51–54 (1986)). 
120. Id. at 434 (citing Renton, 475 U.S. at 46).
121. Id. (citing Renton, 475 U.S. at 47–49). 
122. Id. at 444–45, 448 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
123. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 448 (2002) (“These ordinances
are content based, and we should call them so.”). 
124. Id. at 444 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 450 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he necessary rationale for applying
intermediate scrutiny is the promise that zoning ordinances like this one may reduce the 
costs of secondary effects without substantially reducing speech.”). 
126. Id. at 449–50.
127. Id. at 451.
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a permissible zoning regulation, which a government regulator may 
reasonably believe will reduce negative secondary effects without 
necessarily reducing the production or demand for the speech, with a 
content-based tax, which would reduce secondary effects by the 
impermissible means of reducing demand for the speech.128  He found 
the regulation at issue to be supported by such a proposition because 
the regulating entity could reasonably believe that dispersing erotic 
entertainment businesses could reduce the concentration of criminals 
that create negative secondary effects while not reducing the amount or 
content of erotic entertainment available throughout the city.129   
B. Secondary Effects Analysis
1. As Articulated by the Court
The Court calls the analysis it applies to regulations aimed at
reducing secondary effects “intermediate scrutiny.”130  But its genesis, 
articulations and applications reveal that once a regulation qualifies for 
Secondary Effects Analysis, the Court expects that lower courts will 
review local determinations with a high degree of deference.  The 
statements of the test have morphed over time.  In Young, the plurality 
asked “whether the line drawn by the ordinances is justified by the 
city’s interest in preserving the character of its neighborhoods,” 
without specifically identifying a level of review.131  Justice Powell, 
concurring, viewed the speech restrictions as “incidental and minimal,” 
and applied the expressive conduct test from O’Brien.132  The Court 
128. Id. at 445 (“Though the inference may be inexorable that a city could reduce
secondary effects by reducing speech, this is not a permissible strategy.  The purpose and 
effect of a zoning ordinance must be to reduce secondary effects and not to reduce 
speech.”). 
129. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 449-50, 452-53(2002); see also
Ocello v. Koster, 354 S.W.3d 187, 213 (Mo. 2011) (“Justice Kennedy explained that the 
government is not permitted to reduce secondary effects by the simple expedient of reducing 
the amount of protected speech that occurs, even though it may be logical to assume that 
fewer sexually-oriented businesses will mean fewer customers and so fewer secondary 
effects.”). 
130. See, e.g., City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440 (2002) (citing
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48–50 (1986)). 
131. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) (finding that the record
“disclosed a factual basis for the [city’s] conclusion” that the regulation would be effective, 
noting it was not the Court’s “function to appraise the wisdom of its [choice of means to 
achieve the end],” and that the city “must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment 
with solutions to admittedly serious problems.”). 
132. Id. at 78 (Powell, J., concurring) (“At most the impact of the ordinance on [speech]
interest is incidental and minimal.”); see also id. at 80 (“The factual distinctions between a 
prosecution for destruction of a Selective Service registration certificate, as in O’Brien, and 
this case are substantial, but the essential weighing and balancing of competing interests are 
2017] SECONDARY EFFECTS 405 
also used the O’Brien test to evaluate blanket public nudity bans that 
incidentally prohibit nude dancing, with various Justices writing 
opinions finding a purpose to reduce secondary effects to address one 
of the prongs of the test.  In Renton, the Court drew from “the 
standards applicable to ‘content-neutral’ time, place, or manner 
regulations” to establish what is now Secondary Effects Analysis. 
According to the Court, the appropriate inquiry is whether a regulation 
“is designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and allows for 
reasonable alternative avenues of communication.”133  Oddly, and 
almost casually, the Alameda Books plurality repeated this truncated 
version of the test, which omits the tailoring prong of the time, place, 
or manner test.134  In application, however, the Justices inquired about 
the means/end fit.135 
  The first prong of the analysis is easily satisfied by any regulator 
that qualifies for Secondary Effects Analysis.  A city’s interest in 
“attempting to preserve the quality of urban life” is substantial,136 and 
this is the ultimate goal of regulations aimed at reducing negative 
secondary effects.  More of the Court’s discussion has focused on the 
type and quantity of evidence a regulator must produce to show its rule 
is “designed” to serve that interest.  As to the type of evidence, the 
regulator must show a “link” between the aspect of the erotic 
entertainment business modified by the regulation and the existence of 
the negative secondary effects the regulator aims to reduce.137  
Regulators may rely on any evidence they “reasonably believe to be 
relevant” to “fairly support” their conclusions that the mode of 
operation of the businesses they seek to regulate produce negative 
secondary effects, including evidence from other jurisdictions and, 
where appropriate, “common sense.”138  As to the amount of evidence, 
there is no “high bar for municipalities that want to address merely the 
the same.”) (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)). 
133. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47, 50.
134. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at456 (citing Renton, 475 U.S. at 47–54). A content
neutral regulation must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, 
and . . .  leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for 
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).  Although the test uses the same 
“narrowly tailored” language as the strict scrutiny test, the Court has made clear that the 
intermediate scrutiny requirement of means/end “fit” is less demanding than in strict 
scrutiny.  Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 794. 
135. Renton, 475 U.S. at 52; Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 440–41.
136. Renton, 475 U.S. at 48, 50; Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71
(1976); Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 444 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
137. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 437. 
138. Id. at 438–39.
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secondary effects of protected speech.”139  As Justice Kennedy has said 
most bluntly, “[V]ery little evidence is required.”140  The means chosen 
by the regulator must only be plausible.  The regulator need not prove 
that they will work.141  Courts should accord “deference to the evidence 
presented by the [regulator]” because local entities are “in a better 
position to gather and evaluate data on local problems.”142   
Although the Court has emphasized that the evidentiary burden on 
a regulator is very light, it has left some room for regulated businesses 
to demonstrate that the evidence relied upon by the regulator does not 
“reasonably support” its determination that negative secondary effects 
exist.143  Regulators may not “get away with shoddy data or 
reasoning.”144  To shift the burden of production back to the 
government, the regulated businesses must “cast direct doubt” on the 
regulator’s rationale, either by undermining the validity of the 
regulator’s evidence or presenting evidence of its own that disputes the 
regulator’s factual findings.145   
As to the means/end fit, the content classification is the crucial 
attribute that demonstrates that a regulation is “narrowly tailored” 146  to 
serve its purpose of reducing secondary effects,147 rather than being 
overbroad.  The Renton Court also addressed a claim that the zoning 
regulation before it was unconstitutionally under-inclusive because it 
did not regulate other types of adult businesses that produce similar 
negative secondary effects.  The Court noted that the city could choose 
“first to address the potential problems created by one particular kind 
of adult business” without raising an inference of unconstitutional 
discrimination, and cited Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., its 
quintessential deferential rational review case.148   
139. Id. at 438 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52
(1986)). 
140. Id. at 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 437-38 (plurality opinion).
142. Id. at 440 (citing Turner Broad. Syst., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994) and
Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843-44 (1978)). 
143. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 436 (2002).
144. Id. at 438.
145. Id. at 439–40.
146. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S 781, 800 (1989) (the narrow tailoring
requirement does not incorporate the “no alternate means” requirement that it does when it 
is part of the strict scrutiny test).  
147. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52 (1986) (the ordinance is
narrowly tailored because it applies to “only that category of theaters shown to produce the 
unwanted secondary effects”).  See also Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 81–
82 (Powell, J., concurring) (the “degree of incidental encroachment” on protected speech 
was the “minimum necessary” because the regulation only applied to adult movie theaters). 
148. Renton, 475 U.S. at 52–53 (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488–89
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As to the final prong of the test, regulations may leave open 
reasonable alternative avenues of communication even though they 
dramatically restrict the places where adult theaters may locate.  The 
theaters’ financial burden is not constitutionally relevant, since there is 
no constitutional right to “obtain sites at bargain prices.”149  Regulators 
are required only to “refrain from effectively denying [adult 
businesses] a reasonable opportunity to open and operate.”150  
2. As Applied by the Lower Courts
State and local governments have seized on the possibility of
regulating erotic entertainment businesses and defending the 
regulations by means of Secondary Effects Analysis.  The types of 
regulations have moved well beyond the locational requirements and 
full nudity restrictions reviewed by the Court in the zoning and nude 
dancing lines of cases.  These include requirements that sexually-
oriented businesses be licensed,151 regulations that address the exterior 
of the business, such as lighting or signage,152 and regulations 
(1955)).  This acceptance of underinclusion is in marked contrast to its rejection of the same 
type of reasoning in Erznoznik.  See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 472 U.S. 205, 215 
(1972) (“This Court frequently has upheld underinclusive classifications on the sound theory 
that a legislature may deal with one part of a problem without addressing all of it . . .  This 
presumption of statutory validity, however, has less force when a classification turns on the 
subject matter of expression.”). 
149. Renton, 475 U.S. at 54 (citing Young, 427 U.S. at 71); 427 U.S. at 78 (Powell, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he inquiry for First Amendment purposes is not concerned with economic 
impact.”). 
150. Renton, 475 U.S. at 54.
151. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 223–24, 227–30 (1990) (City’s
licensing scheme for adult entertainment establishments unconstitutional under facial 
challenge, as the city had rested unbridled discretion in decision maker by setting no time 
limits on time for decision); Richland Bookmart, Inc. v. Knox Cnty., Tenn., 555 F.3d 512, 
518–19 (6th Cir. 2009) (County ordinance enacting licensing requirements and other 
regulations, including limitations on operating hours, on sexually-oriented businesses); 
Dream Palace v. County of Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990, 996–97, 997 nn.2, 3 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(County ordinance requiring licensing of adult entertainment businesses, work permits or 
licenses for owners, managers, and employees, and restricting hours); Déjà Vu of Nashville, 
Inc. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 274 F.3d 377, 385–86 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(Metropolitan government ordinance requiring sexually-oriented businesses to obtain a 
license and adult entertainers to obtain a permit from the metro’s Sexually Oriented 
Businesses Licensing Board), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1073 (2002); Schultz v. City of 
Cumberland, 228 F.3d 831, 836–39 (7th Cir. 2000) (comprehensive municipal licensing and 
regulation scheme targeted at town’s sole sexually-oriented business), reh’g and reh’g en 
banc denied (Dec. 1, 2000); DLS, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 107 F.3d 403, 405–06 (6th 
Cir. 1997) (ordinance requiring licensing of facilities and permitting of employees), reh’g 
and suggestion for reh’g en banc denied (Apr. 15, 1997); Kev, Inc. v. Kitsap Cnty., 793 
F.2d 1053, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 1986) (County ordinance regulating topless clubs which did
not serve alcohol).
152. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 461 n.4 (2002) (Souter, J.,
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concerning the inside of the business, dictating such things as stage 
height and distance from customer requirements for nude 
performances,153 and that viewing booths be open.154   Recently, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied Secondary Effects Analysis to 
uphold the County of Los Angeles Safer Sex in the Adult Film Industry 
Act, which mandates, among other things, that adult film actors wear 
condoms during intercourse.155  A common type of regulation limits the 
combination of erotic entertainment and the sale of alcohol.156  
dissenting) (L.A.’s regulation of adult entertainment establishments included lighting 
requirements); Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, Ind., 581 F.3d 460, 461, 462–63 
(7th Cir. 2009) (Premises of adult businesses required to be well-lit); R.V.S., L.L.C. v. City 
of Rockford, 361 F.3d 402, 406 (7th Cir. 2004) (Among the city’s concerns were sexually-
oriented businesses creating “unattractive appearances due to neon lights, gaudy window 
displays, and unsavory clientele”); N.W. Enters., Inc. v. City of Houston, 352 F.3d 162, 
186–88 (5th Cir. 2003) (City’s sexually-oriented business regulations included limitations 
on signage), on reh’g in part, 372 F.3d 333 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 958 (2004); 
Peek-a-Boo Lounge of Bradenton, Inc. v. Manatee Cty., 337 F.3d 1251, 1253 n.1, 1265–66 
(11th Cir. 2003) (physical requirements for adult businesses included lighting standards), 
reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 85 F. App’x 728 (11th Cir. 2003), and cert. denied, 541 
U.S. 988 (2004); Excalibur Grp., Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 116 F.3d 1216, 1218–19 (8th 
Cir. 1997) (City signage requirements); SDJ, Inc. v. Houston, 837 F.2d 1268, 1280 (5th Cir. 
1988) (City signage restrictions on sexually-oriented businesses), reh’g denied, 841 F.2d 
107 (5th Cir. 1988), and cert. denied sub nom. M.E.F. Enters., Inc. v. Houston, 489 U.S. 
1052 (1989). 
153. G.M. Enters., Inc. v. Town of St. Joseph, Wis., 350 F.3d 631, 634, 638 (7th Cir.
2003) (buffer zone of five feet and minimum stage height of 18 inches), cert. denied, 543 
U.S. 812 (2004); Colacurcio v. City of Kent, 163 F.3d 545, 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(requiring a minimum distance of ten feet and a stage height of at least 24 inches; less 
restrictive “no-touch” rules without a buffer zone had proven unenforceable), cert. denied, 
529 U.S. 1053 (2000); Hang On, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 65 F.3d 1248, 1250, 1253–54 
(5th Cir. 1995) (“no-touch” rule forbidding contact between patrons and nude performers). 
154. Fantasyland Video, Inc. v. Cnty. of San Diego, 505 F.3d 996, 1002–04 (9th Cir.
2007); Peek-a-Boo Lounge of Bradenton, Inc. v. Manatee Cty., 337 F.3d 1251, 1264–65 
(11th Cir. 2003), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 85 F. App’x 728 (11th Cir. 2003), and 
cert. denied, 541 U.S. 988 (2004); Pleasureland Museum, Inc. v. Beutter, 288 F.3d 988, 
1003–04 (7th Cir. 2002); Mitchell v. Comm’n on Adult Entm’t Establishments of  Del., 10 
F.3d 123, 141–42 (3rd Cir. 1993); Stadium Book & Video, Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cnty., Nos.
04-20537-CIV JORDAN, 04-20553-CIV-JORDAN, 04-21156-CIV-JORDAN, 2006
WL2374740, at **3, 11, 13 (S.D. Fla., Jul. 31, 2006), aff’d, 253 F. App’x 840 (11th Cir.
2007).
155. Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, 774 F.3d 566, 578 (9th Cir. 2014).
156. See, e.g., California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972); Legend Night Club v.
Miller, 637 F.3d 291, 298 (4th Cir. 2011); Imaginary Images, Inc. v. Evans, 612 F.3d 736, 
741, 743 (4th Cir. 2010); Ben’s Bar, Inc. v. Vill. of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 727 (7th Cir. 
2003); Metro Pony, LLC v. City of Metropolis, No. 11-CV-144-JPG, 2012 WL 1389656, at 
**2, 5 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2012); City of Chi. v. Pooh Bah Enters., 865 N.E.2d 133, 147–49 
(Ill. 2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 941 (2007); Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 729, 735-37 (Cal. App. 2002), 
cert. denied sub nom. Vicary v. Cal. Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 538 U.S. 924 
(2003); see also HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §371-20 (West 2014) Live Adult Entertainment 
Facility Surcharge Act, 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 175/1-175/99 (West 2014); TEX. BUS. & 
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Regulators have prohibited the possession, consumption or sale of 
alcohol in an erotic entertainment business entirely,157 banned the sale 
of mixed drinks in businesses that offer live nude entertainment,158 and 
have taxed the nude entertainment/alcohol combination, directing the 
proceeds into a special fund to address various public objectives, 
including aiding victims of sexual assault.159   
Regulators routinely rely on “reducing negative secondary 
effects” to justify the restrictions imposed on sexually-oriented 
businesses.  Newly enacted regulations commonly recite this aim in a 
preamble, and courts cite these as probative.160  In addition to the 
COM. CODE ANN. §§102.051-102.056 (West 2013). 
157. See, e.g., Curves, LLC v. Spalding Cnty., Ga., 685 F.3d 1284, 1289–90 (11th Cir.
2012) (upholding city ordinance prohibiting nude dancing on licensed premises); 181 South 
Inc. v. Fisher, 454 F.3d 228, 230, 233–34 (3d Cir. 2006) (upholding Alcoholic Beverage 
Control regulation that banned “any lewdness or immoral activity” on licensed premises); 
Sammy's of Mobile, Ltd. v. City of Mobile, 140 F.3d 993, 994–95, 995 n.2, 997 (11th Cir. 
1998) (upholding city ordinance that ban the sale of alcohol to any place "knowingly to 
exhibit, suffer, allow, permit, engage in, participate in, or be connected with, any motion 
picture, show, performance, or other presentation upon the licensed premises, which, in 
whole or in part, depicts nudity or sexual conducts of any simulation thereof”), reh’g and 
suggestion for reh’g en banc denied, 156 F.3d 188 (11th Cir. 1998) and cert. denied, 529 
U.S. 1052 (2000); Metro Pony, LLC v. City of Metropolis, No. 11-CV-144-JPG, 2012 WL 
1389656, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2012) (reviewing city ordinance that prohibited “the 
possession, use and consumption of alcohol on the premises of a sexually oriented 
business”); City of Chi. v. Pooh Bah Enters., 865 N.E.2d 133, 139–40, 165 (Ill. 2006) 
(upholding ordinance prohibiting “establishments licensed to serve alcoholic beverages from 
permitting any employee, entertainer or patron from engag[ing] in any ‘live act, 
demonstration, dance or exhibition which * * * exposes to public view * * * [h]is or her 
genitalia, public hair, buttocks * * * or [a]ny portion of the female breast at or below the 
areola thereof’ ”), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 941 (2007).  The Third Circuit struck down as 
overbroad a Pennsylvania statute and rule prohibiting “lewd, immoral or improper 
entertainment” on licensed premises.  Conchatta, Inc. v. Miller, 458 F.3d 258, 264–65 (3d 
Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1246 (2007).  Pennsylvania currently has no statute 
specifically regulating nude dancing on licensed premises.  
158. Imaginary Images, Inc. v. Evans, 612 F.3d 736, 740 (4th Cir. 2010) (reviewing
regulations of the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board prohibiting establishments 
that offer live erotic dancing from obtaining a license to sell mixed drinks).  
159. Live Adult Entertainment Facility Surcharge Act, 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
175/1-175/99 (West 2014) (imposing a surcharge on live adult entertainment facilities, to be 
paid into the Sexual Assault Services and Prevention Fund); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. 
§§102.051-102.056 (West 2013) (imposing a $5 per entry per customer fee on sexually-
oriented businesses, the first $25 million of which per fiscal biennium is credited to the state
sexual assault program fund).  While Hawaii does not impose a fee on holders of liquor-
dispenser or cabaret licenses, or employers of nude dancers, it does require that such parties
post in an area accessible by employees the number for the National Human Trafficking
Resource Center Hotline.  HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §371-20 (West 2014).
160. See, e.g., Metro Pony, LLC v. City of Metropolis, No. 11-CV-144-JPG, 2012 WL
1389656, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2012) (“It is the purpose of this chapter to regulate 
sexually oriented businesses in order to promote the health, safety, and general welfare of 
the citizens of the City, and to establish reasonable and uniform regulations to prevent the 
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“crime” and “neighborhood degradation” effects primarily relied on by 
the Court as secondary effects,161 the effects have expanded in the 
lower courts to include “lewdness, public indecency, prostitution, 
potential spread of disease, illicit drug use and drug trafficking, 
personal and property crimes, negative impacts on surrounding 
properties, blight, litter, and sexual assault and exploitation,”162 and the 
list continues to grow.163  
deleterious secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses within the City. The provisions 
of this chapter have neither the purpose nor effect of imposing a limitation or restriction on 
the content or reasonable access to any communicative materials, including sexually 
oriented materials.  Similarly, it is neither the intent nor effect of this chapter to restrict or 
deny access by adults to sexually oriented materials protected by the First Amendment, or to 
deny access by the distributors and exhibitors of sexually oriented entertainment to their 
intended market.”) (quoting Ord. § 117.01(a)). 
161. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 435–36 (2002) (accepting a
1977 planning report that indicated “certain crime rates” grew faster and property values 
declined further in areas with high concentrations of adult businesses than in the rest of the 
city); see also id. at 445 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If a city can decrease the crime and 
blight associated with certain speech by the traditional exercise of its zoning power, and at 
the same time leave the quantity and accessibility of the speech substantially undiminished, 
there is no First Amendment objection.”); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 290, 
291 (2000) (“[T]he ordinance prohibiting public nudity is aimed at combating crime and 
other negative secondary effects caused by the presence of adult entertainment 
establishments;” the ordinance mentions “violence, sexual harassment, public intoxication, 
prostitution, the spread of sexually transmitted diseases and other deleterious effects”); 
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569, 571 (1991) (upholding a public nudity ban 
on the basis of the state’s power to regulate public morals); Barnes, 501 U.S. at 583 (Souter, 
J., concurring) (“In my view, the interest asserted by petitioners in preventing prostitution, 
sexual assault, and other criminal activity . . .  is sufficient under O’Brien to justify the 
State’s enforcement of the statute against the type of adult entertainment at issue here”); 
City of Renton v.  Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47–49 (1986) (“The ordinance by its 
terms is designed to prevent crime, protect the city’s retail trade, maintain property values, 
and generally ‘protec[t] and preserv[e] the quality of [the city’s] neighborhoods, commercial 
districts, and the quality of urban life,’ not to suppress the expression of unpopular views”); 
Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.34 (1976) (“The Common Council’s 
determination was that a concentration of ‘adult’ movie theaters causes the area to 
deteriorate and become a focus of crime.”). 
162. 84 Video/Newsstand, Inc. v. Sartini, 455 F. App’x 541, 545 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(quoting S.B. 16, 127th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2007), § 3768.03(B)(1)). 
163. See, e.g., Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 436 (dense foot traffic where adult
establishments are concentrated, which attracts or generates criminal activity); 84 
Video/Newsstand, 455 F. App’x at 545 (“lewdness, public indecency, prostitution, potential 
spread of disease, illicit drug use and drug trafficking, personal and property crimes, 
negative impacts on surrounding properties, blight, litter, and sexual assault and 
exploitation”); New Albany DVD, LLC v. City of New Albany, 581 F.3d 556, 560–61 (7th 
Cir. 2009) (pornographic litter); 181 South, Inc. v. Fischer, 454 F.3d 228, 230 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(“overconsumption of alcohol and inappropriate physical contact between customers and 
dancers”); R.V.S., L.L.C. v. City of Rockford, 361 F.3d 402, 406 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(“unattractive appearances due to neon lights, gaudy window displays, and unsavory 
clientele”); BBL, Inc. v. City of Angola, No. 1:13-CV-76-RLM, 2014 WL 26093 at *4 
(N.D. Ind. Jan. 2, 2014) (“personal and property crimes, prostitution, potential spread of 
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Lower courts have attempted to follow the various directions of 
the Justices in applying Secondary Effects Analysis.164  Where the 
regulation involves zoning, they apply the Renton test.165  Where the 
regulated business sells live nude entertainment, the courts read the 
Court’s directions differently.  Some apply the Renton test.166  Others 
apply the O’Brien expressive conduct test.167  Where the regulation 
restricts the sale of alcohol, the courts have had a particularly difficult 
time deciphering the Court’s directions.168  Courts apply the Renton 
disease, lewdness, public indecency, obscenity, illicit drug use and drug trafficking, negative 
impacts on surrounding properties, urban blight, litter, and sexual assault, and 
exploitation”); Cricket Store 17, LLC v. City of Columbia, 996 F. Supp.2d 422, 425  (D.S.C. 
2014) (“personal and property crimes, prostitution, potential spread of disease, lewdness, 
public indecency, obscenity, illicit drug use and drug trafficking, negative impacts on 
surrounding properties, urban blight, litter, and sexual assault and exploitation”); Keepers, 
Inc. v. City of Milford, 944 F. Supp.2d 129, 142–43 (D. Conn. 2013) (“personal and 
property crimes, prostitution, potential spread of disease, lewdness, public indecency, illicit 
drug use and drug trafficking, negative impacts on property values, urban blight, 
pornographic litter, and sexual assault and exploitation”); Showtime Entm’t LLC v. 
Ammendolia, 885 F. Supp. 2d 507, 520–21 (D. Mass 2012) (“increased crime, and adverse 
impacts on public health, the business climate, the property values of residential and 
commercial property [,] and the quality of life” as well as preserving “the historically rural 
atmosphere of the town” and providing “an opportunity for all elementary school buses to 
finish student bus routes”). 
164. Sutton v. Chanceford Township United States District Court, M.D., 2016 WL
7231702 (“Although there have been many decisions in this field that have shaped the legal 
landscape with respect to the validity of zoning regulations that place some degree of burden 
on protected First Amendment activity or business, the law in this field can be difficult to 
synthesize with clarity.”). 
165. See, e.g., Showtime Entm’t, LLC v. Town of Mendon, 769 F.3d 61, 72 (1st Cir.
2014); Abilene Retail # 30, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Dickinson Cnty., Kan., 492 F.3d 
1164, 1173 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007). 
166. Imaginary Images, Inc. v. Evans,  612 F.3d 736, 742 (4th Cir. 2010); see also
Entm’t Prods., Inc. v. Shelby Cnty., Tenn., 721 F.3d 729, 734–36 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 906 (2014); TJS of N.Y., Inc. v. Town of Smithtown, 598 F.3d 17, 21–22 
(2d Cir. 2010); Doctor John’s v. G. Blake Wahlen, 542 F.3d 787, 789 (10th Cir. 2008); 
Daytona Grand, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach, Fla., 490 F.3d 860, 870 (11th Cir. 2007), 
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1183 (2008); Fantasyland Video, Inc., v. Cnty. of San Diego, 505 
F.3d 996, 1001 (9th Cir. 2007); Ocello v. Koster, 354 S.W.3d 187, 207–09 (Mo. 2011).
167. 84 Video/Newsstand, Inc. v. Sartini, 455 F. App’x 541, 547–48 n.6 (6th Cir. 2011);
see also White River Amusement Pub, Inc. v. Town of Hartford, 481 F.3d 163, 169–70 (2d 
Cir. 2007); Conchatta, Inc., v. Miller, 458 F.3d 258, 267 nn. 7, 8 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. 
denied, 549 U.S. 1246 (2007); Keepers, Inc. v. City of Milford, Conn., 944 F. Supp. 2d 129, 
143 (D. Conn. 2013); Combs v. Texas Entm’t Ass’n, Inc., 347 S.W.3d 277, 288 (Tex. 2011). 
168. The uncertainty is due to a confusing series of cases.  Prior to Young, the Court
used the rational basis test to uphold a restriction on serving alcohol in nude dancing 
establishments.  California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 115–16 (1972).  Language in the 
opinion suggested that the 21st Amendment weakened free speech protections.  Id. at 114–
15, 118–19.  After the Young decision, the Court in 44 Liquormart, Inc., disavowed that 
conclusion, but also stated that states have ample inherent police power to restrict “grossly 
sexual exhibitions” and “bacchanalian revelries” “regardless of whether alcoholic beverages 
were involved.” 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 515 (1996).  In support 
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test,169 the O’Brien test,170 a hybrid analysis designed specifically for 
alcohol/erotic entertainment regulations.171  The different statements of 
the test do not particularly matter, since the Court has said that the 
standard time, place, or manner test and the O’Brien test are basically 
the same.172  But they illustrate the distraction from constitutional 
principle and the obsession with detail that characterizes Secondary 
Effects Analysis.  The multiple prongs of the tests and the parsing of 
the various Justices’ opinions occupy pages while the core question 
never gets asked or addressed: what is the constitutionally principled 
justification for applying deferential analysis to regulations aimed at 
reducing “secondary effects?” 
II. THE IMPACT OF REED V. TOWN OF GILBERT
The Court ratcheted up the doctrinal tension surrounding 
Secondary Effects Analysis through its reasoning and strong language 
in Reed v. Town of Gilbert.173  At issue was the town’s outdoor sign 
code, which treated temporary directional signs, ideological signs, and 
of this statement, it cited both Young (applying rational basis and O’Brien) and Barnes 
(applying O’Brien).  Id. at 515 (1996) (citing Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 
50, 79-82 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); see also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 
560, 566–68 (1991)).   Although Renton had been decided, in which a majority of the Court 
chose the time, place, and manner version of the intermediate scrutiny test to apply to 
regulations that specifically target erotic entertainment, the 44 Liquormart Court did not cite 
it at all. 
169. Imaginary Images, 612 F.3d at 742; see also Entm’t Prods., Inc. v. Shelby Cnty.,
Tenn., 721 F.3d 729, 734–36 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 906 (2014); TJS of 
N.Y., Inc. v. Town of Smithtown, 598 F.3d 17, 21–22 (2d Cir. 2010); Doctor John’s v. G.
Blake Wahlen, 542 F.3d 787, 789 (10th Cir. 2008); Daytona Grand, Inc. v. City of Daytona
Beach, Fla., 490 F.3d 860, 870 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1183 (2008);
Fantasyland Video, Inc., v. Cnty. of San Diego, 505 F.3d 996, 1001 (9th Cir. 2007); Ocello
v. Koster, 354 S.W.3d 187, 207–09 (Mo. 2011). 
170. 84 Video/Newsstand, Inc. v. Sartini, 455 F. App’x 541, 547–48, 548 n.6 (6th Cir.
2011); see also White River Amusement Pub, Inc. v. Town of Hartford, 481 F.3d 163, 169–
70 (2d Cir. 2007); Conchatta, Inc. v. Miller, 458 F.3d 258, 267 nn. 7, 8 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. 
denied, 549 U.S. 1246 (2007); Keepers, Inc. v. City of Milford, Conn., 944 F. Supp. 2d 129, 
143 (D. Conn. 2013); Combs v. Texas Entm’t Ass’n, Inc., 347 S.W.3d 277, 288 (Tex. 2011). 
171. Ben’s Bar, Inc. v. Vill. of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 722 n.27 (7th Cir. 2003); see
also Richland Bookmart, Inc. v. Knox Cnty., Tenn., 555 F.3d 512, 520–21 (6th Cir. 2009); 
Illusions-Dallas Private Club, Inc. v. Steen, 482 F.3d 299, 311 (5th Cir. 2007); 181 South, 
Inc. v. Fischer, 454 F.3d 228, 233–34 (3d Cir. 2006).  
172. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 n.8 (1984) (the two
tests are “little, if any, different” from each other).  The Barnes Court reiterated the 
conclusion that the two tests “embody much the same standards,” noting that the Renton 
plurality had applied the time, place, and manner test, but choosing to apply the O’Brien test 
to the public nudity ban.  Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (citing City 
of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46–47 (1986)).  
173. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
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political signs differently.174  Clyde Reed, the pastor of a small church, 
contested the disadvantageous treatment of the temporary signs used to 
direct members of the public to services, as compared to signs that fell 
within the other classifications.  The Court granted certiorari to 
determine whether the distinction drawn by the code was content-
neutral and subject to intermediate time, place and manner review, as 
the court of appeals had determined, or content-based and subject to 
strict scrutiny.175  
The Court found the distinction to be content-based.176  The Court 
of Appeals had acknowledged that a “cursory examination” of a sign’s 
content would be required to apply the code’s distinctions but held that 
“distinctions based on the speaker or the event” do not require treating 
a law as content-based where there is “no discrimination among similar 
events or speakers”177 or evidence that the disadvantageous treatment 
of some types of signs is “because of [] disagreement with the message 
[they] convey[].”178  By contrast, the Court emphasized that “the 
crucial first step in the content-neutrality analysis” is to determine 
“whether the law is content neutral on its face.”179  The Court explained 
that a law is content-based if it “applies to particular speech because of 
the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.”180  If a law is 
content-based on its face, it is “subject to strict scrutiny regardless of 
the government's benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack 
of “animus toward the ideas contained” in the regulated speech.”181  
This “clear and firm rule” to determine whether a law is content-based, 
the Court emphasized, is “an essential means of protecting the freedom 
of speech.”182  
Although the reasoning and strong language in the Reed opinion 
could appear to rip away the underpinnings of Secondary Effects 
Analysis, the Court did not mention this possibility.183  This is true 
174. Id. at 2224–25. 
175. Id. at 2225–26.
176. Id. at 2227 (“The Town's Sign Code is content based on its face.”).  Justice Thomas
wrote the opinion for the Court, joined by Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Alito and 
Sotomayor.  Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Kenney and 
Sotomayor.   
177. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 707 F.3d 1057, 1069 (9th Cir. 2013).
178. Id. at 1072.
179. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228.
180. Id. at 2227, 2230 (“[A] speech regulation targeted at specific subject matter is
content based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject 
matter.”). 
181. Id. at 2228.
182. Id. at 2231.
183. RCP Publications Inc. v. City of Chi., No. 15 C 11398, 2016 WL 4593830, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 2016) (noting, with respect to established commercial speech precedent, 
414 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:57
even though Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsberg and Breyer, 
concurring in the judgment, explicitly pointed out the contradiction 
between the Court’s “clear and firm rule” and the doctrine that it has 
developed in other contexts, specifically noting Secondary Effects 
Analysis.184  Justice Kagan noted that the Town of Gilbert’s defense of 
its haphazard sign law distinctions did not pass “strict scrutiny, or 
intermediate scrutiny, or even the laugh test,”185 and predicted that the 
Court “and others” will regret the chaos provoked by the majority in 
local sign law.186  Three Justices joined the majority opinion, but wrote 
a concurring opinion acknowledging that “what we have termed 
‘content-based’ laws must satisfy strict scrutiny.”187  They wrote 
separately, however, to emphasize that Reed left room for localities to 
“enact and enforce reasonable sign regulations,”188 and offered 
examples, which may or may not be consistent with the “clear and firm 
rule.”189 
As predicted, local sign law is “coping with uncertainty” in the 
wake of Reed.190  And Reed’s impact has extended beyond sign 
regulations, to other areas.191  As one pertinent example, the Seventh 
Circuit reversed its characterization of a local ordinance prohibiting 
aggressive panhandling in light of Reed,192 and other courts have 
interpreted Reed to dictate this outcome as well.193  But, no court has 
read Reed to do away with Secondary Effects Analysis.  Some courts 
“Reed did not even cite to Central Hudson, let alone expressly modify or overrule it.”). 
184. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2238 (The Court has shown that it can “administer [its] content-
regulation doctrine with a dose of common sense,” applying intermediate scrutiny to laws 
that distinguish speech based on subject matter but where the law's enactment and 
enforcement reveal “not even a hint of bias or censorship.”) (citing and explaining Renton v. 
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) as justified by negative secondary effects).  
185. Id. at 2239.
186. Id. (“This Court may soon find itself a veritable Supreme Board of Sign Review.”).
187. Id. at 2233 (Alito, J., concurring).
188. Id.
189. Enrique Armijo, Reed v. Town of Gilbert: Relax, Everybody, 58 B.C. L. REV. 65, 68
(2017) (noting that some of Justice Alito’s examples “quite obviously did in fact make facial 
references to content”). 
190. Brian J. Connolly & Alan C. Weinstein, Sign Regulation After Reed: Suggestions
for Coping with Legal Uncertainty, 47 THE URB. LAW. 569 at 587 (2015) (noting 
“unanswered questions after Reed”); Lisa Harms Hartzler, Sign Regulation after Reed v. 
Town of Gilbert, Arizona: Greater Clarity or More Confusion?, ILLINOIS REALTORS, 
http://www.illinoisrealtor.org/node/3961 (noting that “[u]nfortunately” the Reed decision is 
“divided,” “opaque,” and “like reading tea leaves”). 
191. Armijo, supra note 189, at 69 (areas include panhandling, intellectual property and
criminal law). 
192. Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2015).
193. McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 185 (D. Mass. 2015) (“Reed
makes earlier cases, which had split over what forms of regulation of panhandling were 
content-based, of limited continuing relevance.”). 
2017] SECONDARY EFFECTS 415 
have applied Secondary Effects Analysis without noting or 
distinguishing Reed.194  The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
explicitly rejected a reading of Reed that would “upend[] established 
doctrine for evaluating regulation of businesses that offer sexually 
explicit entertainment.”195  Courts have reached this same conclusion 
with respect to the category of commercial speech, which has been 
established by Court precedent for approximately the same amount of 
time as Secondary Effects Analysis and similarly, for reasons particular 
to the content of the speech, leads the Court to apply less than strict 
scrutiny to regulations of it.196  These developments confirm that, 
194. E.g., Cricket Store 17, L.L.C. v. City of Columbia, No. 16-1065, 2017 WL 360545
(4th Cir. Jan. 25, 2017); Sutton v. Chanceford Township, Civil No. 1:14-CV-1584, 2016 
WL 7231702, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2016) (denying motion to dismiss because the city 
failed to “make a threshold showing” to distinguish adult-oriented businesses from others); 
7421 West 100th Place Corp. v. Vill. of Bridgeview, No. 13 C 4336, 2016 WL 5373062 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2016); Chi. Joe's Tea Room, LLC v. Vill. of Broadview, No. 07-CV-
2680, 2016 WL 1270398 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2016); see also Boardroom Entertainment 
MKE, LLC v. City of Milwaukee, 158 F. Supp. 3d 743, 747 n.4 (E.D. Wis. 2016) (applying 
secondary effects analysis and noting that the issues in the case were briefed before Reed). 
195. BBL, Inc. v. City of Angola, 809 F.3d 317, 326 n.1 (2015).
196. RCP Publications Inc. v. City of Chi., No. 15 C 11398, 2016 WL 4593830, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 2016) (“This Court . . .  does not see Reed as overturning the Supreme 
Court's consistent jurisprudence subjecting commercial speech regulations to a lesser degree 
of judicial scrutiny.  The case says nothing of the kind.”); Peterson v. Vill. of Downers 
Grove, 150 F. Supp. 3d 910, 928 (N.D.Ill.2015) (“[A]bsent an express overruling of Central 
Hudson, which most certainly did not happen in Reed, lower courts must consider Central 
Hudson and its progeny—which are directly applicable to the commercial-based distinctions 
at issue in this case—binding.”); Mass. Ass’n of Private Career Sch. v. Healey, 159 F. Supp. 
3d 173, 192 (D. Mass. 2016) (“Although only a small number of courts have addressed First 
Amendment challenges to commercial-speech regulations since Reed, almost all of them 
have concluded that Reed does not disturb the Court's longstanding framework for 
commercial speech under Central Hudson.”); id. (citing with parentheticals Contest 
Promotions, LLC v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 2015 WL 4571564, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 
2015) (appeal pending) (“Reed does not concern commercial speech, and therefore does not 
disturb the framework which holds that commercial speech is subject only to intermediate 
scrutiny as defined by the Central Hudson test.”); id. at 193; Citizens for Free Speech, LLC 
v. County of Alameda, 114 F. Supp. 3d 952, 968–69, 2015 WL 4365439, at *13 (N.D. Cal.
2015) (holding that Reed does not alter the analysis for laws regulating off-site commercial
speech); California Outdoor Equity Partners v. City of Corona, No. CV 15–03172 MMM
(AGRx), 2015 WL 4163346, at *10 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2015) (“Reed does not concern
commercial speech, let alone bans on off-site billboards. The fact that Reed has no bearing
on this case is abundantly clear from the fact that Reed does not even cite Central Hudson,
let alone apply it.” (emphasis deleted)); see also Chiropractors United for Research & Educ.,
LLC v. Conway, Civil Action No. 3:15-CV-00556-GNS, 2015 WL 5822721, at *5 (W.D.
Ky. Oct. 1, 2015) (appeal pending) (“Because the [challenged] [s]tatute constrains only
commercial speech, the strict scrutiny analysis of Reed is inapposite.”); CTIA–The Wireless
Ass'n v. City of Berkeley, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1061, (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“[Plaintiff]
completely ignores the fact that the speech rights at issue here are its members' commercial
speech rights . . . .  The Supreme Court has clearly made a distinction between commercial 
speech and noncommercial speech . . .  and nothing in its recent opinions, including Reed, 
416 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:57
absent further action by the Court, Secondary Effects Analysis survives 
its holding and strong statements in Reed.  Reed’s “clear and firm rule” 
thus crystalizes, rather than extinguishes, the fundamental question at 
the root of the doctrinal anomaly that appears bound to stay: in what 
constitutionally significant sense are the effects that justify deferential 
analysis of sexually oriented business regulations “secondary”?  
III. DISTINGUISHING “SECONDARY” EFFECTS
Secondary Effects Analysis is extraordinary.  A facially content-
based regulation may qualify for deferential scrutiny based on two 
prerequisites: that it is “a form of” time, place, or manner regulation197 
and it is “aimed” at the secondary effects of expression and not at the 
content of the expression itself.198  But a content-based time, place, or 
manner restriction is not usually a “form” of regulation that evades 
strict scrutiny.199  The aim of the regulation at “secondary” effects is 
supposed to neutralize the content sensitivity that the rule displays on 
even comes close to suggesting that well-established distinction is no longer valid.”) 
(emphasis in original)). 
197. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47–49 (1986). 
198. Id. at 47, 50 (“The record in this case reveals that Renton relied heavily on the
experience of, and studies produced by, the city of Seattle.  In Seattle, as in Renton, the adult 
theater zoning ordinance was aimed at preventing the secondary effects caused by the 
presence of even one such theater in a given neighborhood.”) (citing Northend Cinema, v. 
Seattle, 585 P.2d 1153 (Wash. 1978)); see also City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 
U.S. 425, 433, 434–35, 438 (2002) (analogizing the ordinance and study at issue to the 
ordinance and study in Renton as similarly aimed at negative secondary effects of nude 
dancing rather than expression); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 291 (2000) 
(“[T]he ordinance prohibiting public nudity is aimed at combating crime and other negative 
secondary effects  cause by the presence of adult entertainment establishments . . .  and not 
at suppressing the erotic message conveyed.”). 
199. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 454–55 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“This ordinance stands
or falls on the results of what our cases speak of as intermediate scrutiny, generally 
contrasted with the demanding standard applied under the First Amendment to a content-
based regulation . . . . While spoken of as content neutral, these regulations are not 
uniformly distinct from the content-based regulations calling for scrutiny that is strict”); see 
also Renton, 475 U.S. at 56–57, 58 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (“The fact that adult movie 
theaters may cause harmful ‘secondary’ land-use effects may arguably give Renton a 
compelling reason to regulate such establishments; it does not mean, however, that such 
regulations are content neutral. . . . ‘[W]hen regulation is based on the content of speech, 
governmental action must be scrutinized more carefully to ensure that communication has 
not been prohibited “merely because public officials disapprove the speaker’s views.” ’ . . . 
‘[B]efore deferring to [Renton’s] judgment, [we] must be convinced that the city is seriously 
and comprehensively addressing’ secondary land-use effects associated with adult movie 
theaters. . . . [B]ecause of the First Amendment interests at stake here, this one-step-at-a-
time analysis is wholly inappropriate.”) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) and Metromedia, Inc., v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 531 
(1981) (Brennan, J., concurring)).  
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its face.200  This is true despite the fact that content-based time, place, 
or manner restrictions that the Court has subjected to strict scrutiny 
seem to aim to reduce the same type of “secondary” effects.201  The 
Justices clearly believe that there is a distinction between “primary” 
and “secondary” effects that is rooted in constitutional principle.  The 
constitutional principle forbids content censorship.202  So, in the 
Justices’ views, “primary” and “secondary” effects track to the content 
of speech in ways that are different in a constitutionally significant 
way.  This view is appealing in its simplicity.  But review of the simple 
distinctions between primary and secondary effects reveals that none of 
them are consistent with free speech jurisprudence or with the types of 
effects the Court has accepted as secondary in the erotic entertainment 
regulations it has reviewed deferentially.203 
A. Psychic vs. Concrete Effects
The Justices agree that whatever the cognitive or psychological
impact of the expression may be – persuasive, pleasing, informative, 
distasteful or damaging – a speech regulation that has the purpose of 
reducing this inner, psychic impact on listeners or viewers aims at the 
primary effects of the speech and prompts strict scrutiny.204  The Court 
has distinguished regulations that target the primary effect, or “direct 
200. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47–48; see also Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 448, 449
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[W]hether a statute is content neutral or content based is 
something that can be determined on the face of it; if the statute describes speech by content 
then it is content based. . . . The zoning context provides a built-in legitimate rationale, 
which rebuts the usual presumption that content-based restrictions are unconstitutional.”). 
201. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993)
(sidewalk congestion); Erzoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (traffic safety); Police 
Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (school disruption). 
202. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2229 (2015) (noting “the danger of
censorship presented by a facially content-based statute”). 
203. John Fee undertook a similar review of possible distinctions between primary and
secondary effects.  See John Fee, The Pornographic Secondary Effects Doctrine, 60 ALA. L. 
REV. 291 (2009).  His review of the descriptive and normative problems with a simple 
distinction between primary and secondary effects is thorough and convincing.  Where we 
differ is in how we would revise Secondary Effects Analysis to make some sense of it. 
204. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 443; id. at 448–49 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at
455–56 (Souter, J., dissenting); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 291 (2000); id. at 
310 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 326–28 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 
Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 570–71 (1991); id. at 577 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 585 (Souter, J., 
concurring); id. at 591 (White, J., dissenting); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 
U.S. 41, 49–50 (1986); id. at 56–57 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Young v. Am. Mini 
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 69–70 (1976); id. at 85–86, 86 n.5 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see 
also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969) (“Whatever the power of the state to 
control public dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot 
constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person’s private 
thoughts.”). 
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impact” of a particular category of speech, from those that aim to 
reduce “a secondary feature that happens to be associated with that 
type of speech.”205    
The problem with this distinction is that it does not seem to 
acknowledge or address the status of concrete effects that bear more 
than a happenstance relationship to the content of the regulated speech. 
In a number of contexts, the Court has held that a government purpose 
to restrict speech for the purpose of avoiding conduct listeners may 
engage in because they are provoked by the psychic impact of the 
speech is so directly connected to the content of the speech that it 
signals unconstitutional censorship and requires strict scrutiny.  A 
purpose to avoid violent conduct by listeners because they disagree 
with the content of speech is a purpose to suppress speech because of 
its content,206 which presumptively violates the free speech guarantee. 
A purpose to avoid bad conduct by listeners because they agree with 
the message of the speech also requires strict review.207  A government 
purpose to reduce these listener-perpetrated effects, whether they are 
labeled primary or secondary, does not support a move into deferential 
review.208  So, secondary effects that justify the move into deferential 
Secondary Effects Review do not include all effects other than the 
psychic impact of speech.   
205. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321, 322 (1988) (“To take an example factually close
to Renton, if the ordinance there were justified by the city’s desire to prevent the 
psychological damage it felt was associated with viewing adult movies, then analysis of the 
measure as a content-based statute would have been appropriate.  The hypothetical 
regulation targets the direct impact of a particular category of speech, not a secondary 
feature that happens to be associated with that type of speech.”). 
206. Forsyth Cnty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–35 (1992)
(“Listeners’ reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation. . . .  Speech 
cannot be financially burdened, any more than it can be punished or banned, simply because 
it might offend a hostile mob.”); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 508 (1969) (“[U]ndifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to 
overcome the right to freedom of expression.”).  But see City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, 
Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 444–45 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that when speech 
“produce[s] tangible consequences [like] prompt[ing] actions,” the actions are primary 
effects, but also referring to the hostile audience reaction in Forsyth County as a secondary 
effect, but one which did not qualify for secondary effects analysis). 
207. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (establishing incitement test for
restricting speech because it persuades listeners to engage in bad conduct); Am. Booksellers 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328–30 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying strict scrutiny to 
pornography regulates aimed at reducing negative societal effects from portrayals of women 
as subordinate), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001, and reh’g denied, 475 U.S. 1132 (1986).   
208. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (restricting violent
video games because the content will cause harm to children or cause them to act 
aggressively is subject to strict scrutiny). 
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B. No Causal Relationship to Listener Reactions to Speech Content
Another possible distinction between effects that prompt strict
scrutiny and Secondary Effects Analysis is that the latter are not caused 
at all by the psychic impact of the speech on listeners.  This assumption 
seems to underlie a number of explanations offered by the Court and 
individual Justices.  In Boos v. Barry, the Court distinguished the 
primary effect of wounded dignity due to offensive speech from 
secondary effects such as “congestion, []interference with ingress or 
egress, [] visual clutter, or [interference with] the security of 
embassies.”209  Most recently, Justice Kennedy, in his controlling 
concurring opinion in Alameda Books, echoed the definition offered by 
the Court in Boos, describing secondary effects as “unrelated to the 
impact of the speech on its audience.”210  His analogies to pollution 
produced by a newspaper factory and the view obstruction caused by 
billboards suggest that the “unrelated to the impact of the speech on its 
audience” requirement means that to qualify for Secondary Effects 
Analysis, the effects of erotic speech must, like these examples, not be 
caused in any way by the content of the speech.211  
It is true that in some instances, the secondary effects of a speech 
regulation may be “unrelated to the impact of the speech on its 
audience” because they are not caused at all by the content of the 
speech.  Secondary effects that are the targets of content-neutral time, 
place, or manner regulations and of regulations that incidentally restrict 
expressive conduct are caused exclusively by the means of delivery, 
not by the content of the speech.212   Because these types of secondary 
effects bear no causal relationship to the content of the speech, a 
government purpose to reduce them does not signal a government 
purpose to suppress the speech because of its message.  Although the 
move from strict to intermediate scrutiny with these types of 
regulations is not typically explained as being because of a purpose 
aimed at “secondary effects,” the fact that these effects are not caused 
at all by the message of the speech drives the constitutional analysis, 
which hinges on the core principle that an apparent government 
purpose to censor speech because of its message requires strict judicial 
209. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321, 322 (1988).
210. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 444 (2002) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). 
211. Id.
212. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 792, 794 (1989) (disturbance caused
by noise levels); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 378–80 (1968) (disruption to 
efficient operation of Selective Service caused by not having a valid card). 
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review.213 
But the lack of causal relationship between the psychic impact of 
the speech and the secondary effects does not generally remove time, 
place, or manner restrictions from strict scrutiny if the regulation 
identifies its targets according to the content of the speech.  In fact, the 
lack of relationship proves the regulation’s unconstitutionality.  For 
example, the rule in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley that 
restricted all picketing outside schools except during labor disputes was 
a time, place, or manner regulation aimed at reducing effects that 
qualify as secondary.214  But the mode of delivery modified by the 
regulation did not interact with the content of the speech subject to the 
regulation to create negative secondary effects peculiar to the 
combination of the content of the speech and the mode of delivery.215  
Consequently, restricting the mode of delivery discriminated against 
speech on the basis of its content, because the content of the speech did 
not contribute to the secondary effects the government sought to 
eliminate.216  In City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 
similarly, there was no showing that commercial news racks created 
more sidewalk congestion than news racks distributing other types of 
speech.217  And, the Young plurality distinguished the Court’s prior 
213. Ward, 491 U.S. at 792 (explaining that ‘[t]he principal justification for the sound-
amplification guideline is the city's desire to control noise levels at bandshell events, in 
order to retain the character of the Sheep Meadow and its more sedate activities, and to 
avoid undue intrusion into residential areas and other areas of the park,” noting that “the 
guideline “ha[s] nothing to do with content,” (referencing Boos, 108 S. Ct. at 1163), and 
“satisfies the requirement that time, place, or manner regulations be content neutral” without 
explicit reference to secondary effects). 
214. Police Dep’t of Chi. V. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972) (City justified the
ordinance as “a device for preventing disruption of the school”). 
215. Id. at 99–101 (City could not pick and choose which picketing should be allowed
based on potential for disruption tied to the message: “Chicago may not vindicate its interest 
in preventing disruption by the wholesale exclusion of picketing on all but one preferred 
subject.”).  
216. Id. at 100, 101 (“Although preventing school disruption is a city’s legitimate 
concern, Chicago itself has determined that peaceful labor picketing during school hours is 
not an undue interference with school . . . . No labor picketing could be more peaceful or 
less prone to violence than Mosley’s solitary vigil.  In seeking to restrict nonlabor picketing 
that is clearly more disruptive than peaceful labor picketing, Chicago may not prohibit all 
nonlabor picketing at the school forum”); see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465 
(1980) (“[N]othing in the content-based labor-nonlabor distinction [of the residential 
picketing ordinance] has any bearing whatsoever on [the state’s asserted interest in 
protecting residential privacy]”).  
217. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 429–30 (1993) (city’s ban on
newsracks distributing commercial handbills while allowing newsracks selling newspapers 
was based on “the content of the publication resting inside [the] newsrack” and thus content-
based; moreover, despite the city’s assertion that the ordinance was justified in limiting the 
total number of newsracks due to aesthetic concerns, the ordinance did not lower the total 
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decision in Erznoznik, noting that although traffic impact is a 
secondary effect, deferential analysis was not appropriate because that 
impact was not particularly caused by the content of the speech.218  So, 
regulators generally may not impose a time, place, or manner 
restriction on speech with a particular content without justifying the 
selectivity by linking the speech content to the harms they seek to 
avoid.  Without the link, the speech burden appears as censorship or, at 
least, irrational.219 
The same is true of erotic entertainment and its secondary effects. 
Regulations that aim to reduce the negative secondary effects of 
businesses that sell erotic, but not other, expression must be justified by 
a “link” between the expressive product and the effects or the 
distinction will not pass even minimal rational basis scrutiny.220  Scores 
of studies currently exist documenting the secondary effects produced 
by various types of sexually-oriented businesses in various locations, 
and offering evidence and arguments as to particular attributes of the 
businesses that cause these effects.221  Regulators must offer some basis 
to support their assertions that their aim is to reduce secondary effects 
to enter Secondary Effects Analysis and, once in it, they may have to 
offer some evidence to demonstrate that they could reasonably believe 
that their chosen means will do so.  The Court has made clear that 
regulators may generalize about these effects from evidence gathered 
about other types of sexually-oriented businesses and from different 
locations, confirming that regulators may reasonably conclude that the 
documented secondary effects are caused by the sexually-oriented 
businesses and not by happenstance. 
In fact, after offering the examples of pollution and obstructed 
views as secondary effects, Justice Kennedy, in his Alameda Books 
concurrence, noted that the reason why regulators may “identify 
[erotic] speech based on content” is that it is “a shorthand for 
number of newsracks, only those distributing commercial handbills). 
218. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.34 (1976) (citing Erzoznik v.
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 215 (1975)). 
219. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 100–101 (“Predictions about imminent disruption from
picketing involve judgments appropriately made on an individualized basis, not by means of 
broad classifications, especially those based on subject matter. Freedom of expression, and 
its intersection with the guarantee of equal protection, would rest on a soft foundation 
indeed if government could distinguish among picketers on such a wholesale and categorical 
basis.”). 
220. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 437 (2002).
 221. SECONDARY EFFECTS 
RESEARCH,https://web.archive.org/web/20170316033750/http://www.secondaryeffectsresea
rch.com/biblio.  
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identifying the secondary effects outside.”222  These effects occur 
because “a critical mass of unsavory characters” is attracted to the 
vicinity “and the crime rate may increase as a result.”223  This 
acknowledgement highlights a crucial difference between the 
“secondary effects” of content-neutral time, place, or manner 
regulations and secondary effects that prompt deferential review of 
sexually-oriented business regulations.  This is that the secondary 
effects of sexually-oriented businesses are, for the most part, not 
generated by the speakers’ actions of producing or disseminating the 
speech,224 but rather by third parties (“unsavory characters”), who are 
either listeners or others attracted to the vicinity because listeners will 
be there.  These third party actions are the result of human choices that 
must be provoked in some way by the content of the expression sold by 
the sexually-oriented businesses or singling them out for regulation 
would not be rational.225  Consequently, in the circumstances where 
Secondary Effects Analysis applies, the “unrelated to the impact of the 
speech on its audience” description must have a more precise meaning 
than that the effects and the content of the speech lack any causal 
relationship. 
222. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 449 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
223. Id. at 452.
224. The adverse public health effect of disease caused by the production of sex films,
and which provoked California’s various efforts to impose condom-use requirements, is a 
secondary effect of sexually oriented businesses analogous to the secondary effects 
addressed by content neutral time, place or manner regulations.  Victoria Colliver, Health & 
Human Services: Porn Industry Defeats Condom Requirements in California, GOVERNING 
THE STATES AND LOCALITIES (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.governing.com/topics/health-
human-services/tns-california-porn-condoms.html; Bill Chappell, Condom Mandate For 
Porn Industry Falls Short In California, CAPITAL PUBLIC RADIO; THE TWO-WAY (Nov. 9, 
2016 10:05 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/11/09/501405749/condom-
mandate-for-porn-industry-falls-short-in-california; See, e.g., Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. 
Fielding, 774 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2014) (refusing to enjoin a Los Angeles County ordinance 
requiring that performers in adult films who engaged in anal or vaginal intercourse obtain a 
public health permit prior to filming within the county and to use condoms during filming of 
such acts). 
225. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438–39 (plurality opinion) (“The [government’s]
evidence must fairly support [its] rationale for its ordinance;” if the plaintiff succeeds in 
casting doubt on the rationale, the burden shifts back to the government to supplement the 
record with evidence supporting the theory justifying the ordinance); Giovani Carandola, 
Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 516–17 (4th Cir. 2002) (sufficient evidence existed that “bars 
and clubs that present nude or topless dancing” spawn “deleterious effects,” including 
“prostitution and the criminal abuse and exploitation of young women,” but “no evidence, 
no judicial opinion, not even any argument . . . suggest[s] that these  mainstream 
entertainments, to which . . . the restrictions apply, produce the kind of adverse secondary 
effects that the state seeks to prevent. . . . Thus, the restrictions burden these performances, 
and the right of North Carolinians to view them, without any justification at all [, which 
renders the restrictions unconstitutionally overbroad.]”). 
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C. Distant Causal Relationship to Listener Reactions to Speech
Content
The dissenters in Barnes argued that the crimes and sex-related 
misconduct that the city allegedly aimed to reduce, through its nude 
dancing ban, were properly classified as effects that should provoke 
strict scrutiny because they were necessarily provoked by the 
persuasive effect of the “emotions and feelings of eroticism and 
sensuality among the spectators” generated by the constitutionally 
protected expression.226  The connection cannot be denied, but it is 
possible to create distance between listeners’ reactions to the content of 
the speech and the negative conduct so that the connection between the 
two is less obvious.227  The Supreme Court cases generally rely on 
“crime” and “blight,” including reduced property values and quality of 
life, as secondary effects.228  The considerable evidence available 
documenting the secondary effect of “crime” in the vicinity of 
sexually-oriented businesses creates this type of distance and obscurity. 
Although it cannot be broken entirely, it is possible to expand the 
226. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 592 (1991) (White, J. dissenting).
227. Id. at 585–86  (Souter, J., concurring) (responding that it was not clear “what the
precise causes of the correlation [between the content of the speech and the effects] actually 
are,” and that the Renton Court had determined that the ordinance at issue was “justified 
without reference to the content of the regulated speech” and there was no need to “decide 
whether the cause of the correlation might have been the persuasive effects of the adult films 
that were being regulated” (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 
48 (1986)). 
228. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 435–38 (accepting a 1977 planning report that
indicated “certain crime rates” grew faster and property values declined further in areas with 
high concentrations of adult businesses than in the rest of the city); see also id. at 445 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If a city can decrease the crime and blight associated with 
certain speech by the traditional exercise of its zoning power, and at the same time leave the 
quantity and accessibility of the speech substantially undiminished, there is no First 
Amendment objection.”); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 290, 291 (2000) (“[T]he 
ordinance prohibiting public nudity is aimed at combating crime and other negative 
secondary effects caused by the presence of adult entertainment establishments”; the 
ordinance mentions “violence, sexual harassment, public intoxication, prostitution, the 
spread of sexually transmitted diseases and other deleterious effects” (quoting Pap’s A.M. v. 
City of Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 279 (Pa. 1998))); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 
569, 571 (1991) (upholding a public nudity ban on the basis of the state’s power to regulate 
public morals); id. at 583 (Souter, J., concurring) (“In my view, the interest asserted by 
petitioners in preventing prostitution, sexual assault, and other criminal activity . . .  is 
sufficient under O’Brien to justify the State’s enforcement of the statute against the type of 
adult entertainment at issue here”); City of Renton v.  Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 
47–49 (1986) (“The ordinance by its terms is designed to prevent crime, protect the city’s 
retail trade, maintain property values, and generally ‘protec[t] and preserv[e] the quality of 
[the city’s] neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban life,’ not to 
suppress the expression of unpopular views.”); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 
50, 71 n.34 (1976) (“The Common Council’s determination was that a concentration of 
‘adult’ movie theaters causes the area to deteriorate and become a focus of crime.”). 
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distance between “crimes” listed as secondary effects and viewers’ 
reactions to erotic speech first, by identifying the negative conduct as 
committed by someone other than an erotic entertainment patron and 
second, to the extent the patron is involved in the conduct, to identify 
the patron’s conduct in a way that it does not appear prompted by the 
sexually stimulating content of the speech.  Studies and expert 
testimony have done this by correlating the negative “effect” of  many 
types of “crime” in the vicinity of sexually-oriented businesses to the 
characteristics of patrons that make them high quality crime victims 
and likely crime consumers.229  Specifically, 
[T]he targets found at adult businesses are exceptionally attractive
to offenders.  This reflects the presumed characteristics of adult
business patrons.  They are disproportionately male, open to vice
overtures, and carry cash.  Most important of all, when victimized,
they are reluctant to involve the police.  From the offender’s
perspective, they are “perfect” victims.230
The Court appears to adhere to this type of distance theory.  In 
describing its reasoning in Renton, it stated that the regulator’s “desire 
to suppress crime ha[d] nothing to do with the actual films being shown 
229. There are a number of experts who are frequent flyers in the area of secondary-
effects testimony, as governments increasingly rely on “prepackaged” studies from other 
areas; two of the most active, frequently on opposing sides of the issue, are Daniel Linz and 
Richard McCleary; Abilene Retail # 30, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Dickinson Cnty., Kan., 
492 F.3d 1164, 1170 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Neither Linz nor McCleary are strangers to 
litigation challenging municipal zoning ordinances that target adult businesses – both have 
testified in many such cases”); see also Christopher Seaman & Daniel Linz, Are Adult 
Businesses Crime Hotspots?  Comparing Adult Businesses to Other Locations in Three 
Cities, J. CRIMINOLOGY, (2014), http://www.hindawi.com/journals/jcrim/2014/783461/cta/; 
Alan C. Weinstein & Richard McCleary, The Association of Adult Businesses with 
Secondary Effects: Legal Doctrine, Social Theory, and Empirical Evidence, 29 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L. J. 565 (2011).  
230. Richard McCleary, Rural Hot Spots: The Case of Adult Businesses, 19 CRIM. JUST. 
POL’Y REV., 153, 156 (2008); see also Entm’t Prods., Inc. v. Shelby Cnty., Tenn., 721 F.3d 
729, 741 (6th Cir. 2013) (expert report submitted by Duncan Associates suggested that “the 
combination of drinking [‘to the point of total inebriation’] and sexual stimulation increased 
the risk of patrons becom[ing] targets for crime, as these individuals are likely to ‘have their 
guard down’ ”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 906 (2014).  However, not all lower courts agree 
that patrons should be protected from themselves. “The ‘theft’ line of argument starts with 
the premise that many customers of adult establishments pay in cash, which makes them a 
target for thieves. . . . The theft argument is paternalistic.  Why can’t customers make their 
own assessments of risk?  The norm under the [F]irst [A]mendment is that government must 
combat harm to readers with disclosures rather than prohibitions of speech. Just as there is 
no hecklers’ veto over speech, there is no ‘thieves’ veto.  The police must protect the readers 
from the hecklers or thieves, rather than ease their workload by forbidding the speech.”  
New Albany DVD, LLC v. City of New Albany, Ind., 581 F.3d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(second emphasis added) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 978 (2010). 
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inside adult movie theaters.”231  More recently, the plurality and 
concurring opinions in Alameda Books described the secondary effect 
of “crime” in ways that are consistent with causal distancing.232  And 
Justice Souter in his Barnes concurrence relied upon it even with 
respect to sex crimes.233  Regulators and their experts have also 
documented the other major category of negative secondary effects, 
“blight,” which includes adverse effects on property values, in ways 
that plausibly distance these effects from the direct public reaction of 
“offense” to the content of the erotic speech.234  Although the distance 
theory is not an entirely satisfying way to implement the Constitution’s 
core anti-censorship principle,235 it seems like what the Justices have in 
231. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1988) (citing City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986)). 
232. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 436 (2002) (it was “reasonable,
for [the city] to suppose that a concentration of adult establishments is correlated with high 
crime rates because a concentration of operations in one locale draws, for example, a greater 
concentration of adult consumers to the neighborhood, and a high density of such consumers 
either attracts or generates criminal activity.”); Id. at 452 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (the 
evidence showed that ‘[t]wo or more adult businesses in close proximity seem to attract a 
critical mass of unsavory characters, and the crime rate may increase as a result.”). 
233. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 584 (1991) (Souter, J. concurring) (“the
State of Indiana could reasonably conclude that forbidding nude entertainment of the type 
offered at the Kitty Kat Lounge and the Glen Theatre's ‘bookstore’ furthers its interest in 
preventing prostitution, sexual assault, and associated crimes.”). 
234. CONNIE B. COOPER & ERIC DAMIAN KELLY, TEX. CITY ATTORNEYS ASS’N,
SURVEY OF TEXAS APPRAISERS: SECONDARY EFFECTS OF SEXUALLY-ORIENTED BUSINESSES 
ON MARKET VALUES iii, iv (June 2008), SECONDARY EFFECTS RESEARCH, 
http://www.secondaryeffectsresearch.com/node/83 (“Although it is certainly possible to 
provide expert and other evidence of such concepts as “blight” and “downgrading,” it is 
much safer for a local government to use evidence that is easily measurable.  The two types 
of secondary effects that are most often associated with sexually-oriented businesses and 
that are also measurable are effects on crime rates and effects on property values at and near 
such a business.  This study takes place in that context. . . . Documenting measurable, 
negative secondary effects is the most practical and most widely accepted method of 
establishing such a purpose.  Courts once appeared to accept a mere recitation of negative 
secondary effects and later were willing to allow a community to rely on studies of such 
effects from other communities; today, in the context of often-effective legal challenges by 
the sex industry, courts have raised their expectations.  Today they expect more. In this 
study, city attorneys and other officials in Texas will find substantial evidence of measurable 
negative secondary effects of retail-only sex businesses on both crime rates and property 
values, and additional evidence of the negative effects of other sex businesses on property 
values.”).   
235. John Fee, The Pornographic Secondary Effects Doctrine, 60 ALA. L. REV. 291, 307
(2009) (“[I]t is typically because of the downstream social consequences that government 
officials often wish to regulate dangerous speech . . . . If all downstream consequences of 
dangerous or negative speech counted as secondary effects, then many of the classic First 
Amendment cases, including those involving subversive speech, offensive speech, false 
statements, and speech harmful to the political process, for example, should have been 
decided under the standard of intermediate scrutiny.  Because government could always 
look further down the chain of causation to find a secondary effect for its justification, strict 
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mind when they describe the secondary effects of erotic entertainment 
as “unrelated to the impact of the speech on its audience.”236 
The causal distance theory can distance and obscure the cause-
and-effect relationship between erotic entertainment and negative 
effects in the context of zoning.  But with other types of erotic 
entertainment regulations now routinely subject to Secondary Effects 
Analysis, its plausibility breaks down.  In no instance is this more 
evident than with the class of regulations that restrict the combination 
of erotic entertainment and the sale of alcohol.  To be sure, it is 
possible to articulate a theory of alcohol/erotic entertainment negative 
effects that creates distance between the reaction of the audience and 
the conduct the government seeks to reduce.  To the extent that a 
regulator’s reasoning is that alcohol consumption makes adult business 
patrons even better crime victims, who attract more criminals, the 
negative effect of “crime” may be secondary according to the distance 
theory.237  Similarly, “crime” may plausibly be a “distant” secondary 
effect where the regulator relies on evidence that patrons of erotic 
entertainment establishments engage in crimes that are not apparently 
provoked by the sexual stimulation or gratification message of the 
speech, such as theft, assault or battery against someone who is not a 
potential sex partner, or drug crimes.238  
But distant effects are not what regulators and courts are talking 
about when they unabashedly rely on the “common sense” and 
“confirmed by human experience” consequences of the “explosive 
combination” of alcohol and erotic entertainment.239  As one court 
summarized the testimony of one expert, “[A]lcohol consumption 
facilitates sexual and aggressive impulses and impairs social judgment. 
When combined with sexual stimulation, it produces an effect 
‘associated with an increase in violent sexual acting out, acts of 
criminal behavior.’ ”240  According to this theory, the sexual stimulation 
scrutiny would cease to exist as a meaningful restraint on content-based speech 
regulations.”). 
236. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 444 (2002) (Kennedy, J.
concurring). 
237. Entm’t Prods., Inc. v. Shelby Cnty., Tenn., 721 F.3d 729, 741 (6th Cir. 2013); see
also Richard McCleary, Rural Hot Spots: The Case of Adult Businesses, 19 CRIM. JUST. 
POL’Y REV. 153, 156 (2008). 
238. Peek-a-Boo Lounge of Bradenton, Inc. v. Manatee Cty., 337 F.3d 1251, 1270–71, 
1270 n.19 (11th Cir. 2003). 
239. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 439 (2002); City of Chi. v.
Pooh Bah Enters., Inc., 865 N.E.2d 133, 157 (Ill. 2006); Imaginary Images, Inc. v. Evans, 
612 F.3d 736, 745 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Blue Canary Corp. v. City of Milwaukee, 251 
F.3d 1121, 1124 (7th Cir. 2001)).
240. Pooh Bah Enters, 865 N.E.2d at 157.
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delivered by the erotic entertainment directly provokes the negative 
“effect” of “violent sexual acting out” that the government aims to 
reduce through its regulation.241  Courts have included on their lists of 
negative secondary effects of the erotic entertainment/alcohol 
combination “unwanted interactions between patrons and 
entertainers.”242  This causal relationship between the reaction of erotic 
entertainment viewers and the negative effect the government seeks to 
eliminate is very difficult to square with the “unrelated to the impact on 
[the] audience” concept of secondary effects, at least as thus far 
explained by the Court.243 
This open acknowledgement by regulators, experts and courts that 
the viewers’ reactions to the sexual stimulation of the erotic speech 
directly cause the conduct labeled “secondary effects” forces a review 
of so-called “secondary effects” outside the context of alcohol 
restrictions.  The crime-victim theory relies on the proclivities and 
behaviors of sexually-oriented business patrons, who are “listeners,” 
and who are attracted to or influenced by the content of the speech sold 
by the business.  The speech prompts the patrons, and the patrons 
prompt the criminal conduct.244  Despite the slight distance between 
speech and conduct, it is quite clear that restricting business operations 
for the purpose of reducing the number of criminals attracted to the 
vicinity traces to the content of the speech.  Moreover, almost every list 
of secondary effects includes explicit references to sex crimes, and 
more or less oblique references to sex acts.245  Patrons engage in most 
241. Id.
242. Imaginary Images, Inc. v. Evans, 612 F.3d 736, 742 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Giovani
Carandola, Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 513 (4th Cir. 2002)).  A study commissioned by the 
Texas City Attorneys Association found that courts had recognized that patrons were 
responsible for the bad acts committed in the neighborhoods surrounding “on-site” adult 
businesses, but argued that the same restrictions should apply to the kind of “off-site” 
businesses where patrons did not linger to consume the pornography they had purchased.  
CONNIE B. COOPER & ERIC DAMIAN KELLY, TEX. CITY ATTORNEYS ASS’N, SURVEY OF 
TEXAS APPRAISERS: SECONDARY EFFECTS OF SEXUALLY-OWNED BUSINESSES ON 
MARKET VALUES 30 (June 2008), SECONDARY EFFECTS RESEARCH, 
http://www.secondaryeffectsresearch.com/node/83. 
243. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 444 (2002) (Kennedy, J.
concurring). 
244. Eric S. McCord & Richard Tewksbury, Does the Presence of Sexually Oriented
Businesses Relate to Increased Levels of Crime? An Examination Using Spatial Analyses, 
59 CRIME & DELINQ. 1108, 1112-13 (2012) (“Crime can be expected at and in the vicinity 
of SOBs due to the presence of motivated offenders as well. Motivated offenders may be 
drawn to the SOB because of the presence of suitable victims, and they too are often under 
the influence of alcohol.”). 
245. Peek-a-Boo Lounge of Bradenton, Inc. v. Manatee Cnty., Fla., 630 F.3d 1346,
1355–56 (11th Cir. 2011)  (secondary effects put forward by county include “personal and 
property crimes, public safety risks, prostitution, potential spread of disease, lewdness, 
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of these sex acts concurrently or after viewing the sexually-stimulating 
speech.246 With “manner” regulations reviewed by lower courts, such 
as minimum-distance, no-touch, and open-viewing booth requirements, 
the causal link between the audience’s reaction to the sexual 
stimulation delivered by the erotic entertainment and the conduct 
“effects” that regulators seek to reduce is too obvious to ignore.247  
Beyond the obvious, all secondary effects used to justify sexually-
oriented business regulations trace to behaviors that are sympathetic to 
the content of the erotic expression.  Most trace to patron behaviors in 
public indecency, illicit sexual activity, illicit drug use and drug trafficking, undesirable and 
criminal behavior associated with alcohol consumption, negative impacts on surrounding 
properties, litter, and sexual assault and exploitation”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2973 (2011); 
Imaginary Images, Inc., v. Evans, 612 F.3d 736, 742 (4th Cir. 2010) (“public sexual 
conduct”); Gammoh v. City of La Habra, 395 F.3d 1114, 1125 (9th Cir. 2005) (secondary 
effects include “increased threat of the spread of sexually transmitted diseases” and the 
ordinance sought “the protection of the peace, welfare, and privacy of persons who 
patronize adult businesses”), amended on denial of reh’g, 402 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 2005); 
Colacurcio v. City of Kent, 163 F.3d 545, 554 (9th Cir. 1998) (buffer zone requirements are 
“a narrowly tailored means of controlling illegal sexual contact and narcotics transactions” 
and no-touch rules without accompanying buffer zones “would fail to provide sufficient 
line-of-vision for law enforcement personnel” and “would permit verbal communication 
between dancers and patrons, thereby failing to curtail propositions for drugs or sex”); 
Mitchell v. Comm’n on Adult Entm’t  of Del., 10 F.3d 123, 143 (3rd Cir. 1993) (“the 
legislature [did not] arbitrarily and irrationally [believe] that closed booths contribute to 
serious public health problem”).  
246. A study commissioned by the Texas City Attorneys Association found that courts
had recognized that patrons were responsible for the bad acts committed in the 
neighborhoods surrounding “on-site” adult businesses, but argued that the same restrictions 
should apply to the kind of “off-site” businesses where patrons did not linger to consume the 
pornography they had purchased.  CONNIE B. COOPER & ERIC DAMIAN KELLY, TEX. CITY 
ATTORNEYS ASS’N, SURVEY OF TEXAS APPRAISERS: SECONDARY EFFECTS OF SEXUALLY-
OWNED BUSINESSES ON MARKET VALUES, 30 (June 2008), SECONDARY EFFECTS 
RESEARCH, http://www.secondaryeffectsresearch.com/node/83.  
247. Colacurcio v. City of Kent, 163 F.3d 545, 554 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding a
minimum distance rule because a simple “no-touch” rule was unenforceable and permitted 
illicit contact between patrons and dancers); Hang On, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 65 F.3d 
1248, 1253 (5th Cir. 1995) (upholding no-touch rule because “intentional contact between a 
nude dancer and a bar patron is conduct beyond the expressive scope of the dancing itself.  
The conduct at that point has overwhelmed any expressive strains it may contain. . . . 
Similarly, patrons have no First Amendment right to touch a nude dancer.”); Mitchell v. 
Comm’n on Adult Entm’t Establishments of Del., 10 F.3d 123, 142 (3rd Cir. 1993) 
(supporting an open-booth amendment because “the booths are little more than masturbation 
booths" and "the legislation was intended to stop the spread of sexually related diseases”); 
Fantasyland Video, Inc. v. Cty. of San Diego, 373 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1113 (S.D. Cal. 2005) 
(rejecting plaintiff’s argument that an open-booth requirement was unconstitutional because 
“most customers disfavor viewing sexually oriented motion pictures in an open setting” 
since “an open-booth requirement does not reduce speech because it does not limit what 
movies can be shown, and does not preclude anyone from using the booths as a means for 
viewing movies”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded sub nom. Tollis, Inc. v. Cty. of 
San Diego, 505 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2007), and aff’d, 505 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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response to the content of the expression,248 or to patron proclivities.249  
In any of these situations, the effects trace to listeners’ reactions to the 
content of the expression.  In other contexts, where the government 
seeks to regulate speech because of listener behaviors, strict scrutiny 
applies to determine when the government may act.250  If Secondary 
Effects Analysis is to credibly implement constitutional principle, 
something other than the degree of causal distance between expression, 
audience reaction and conduct must explain what makes an effect 
“secondary,” such that deferential scrutiny applies. 
D. No Causal Relationship to Negative Listener Reactions to Speech
Content
By directly analogizing regulations subject to Secondary Effects 
Analysis to regulations that are facially content neutral, the Justices 
have suggested that something about the secondary effects at which 
erotic entertainment regulations aim breaks the link to the audience 
reaction to the content of the speech in the same way as the effects 
aimed at by content-neutral regulations.  This can be plausible when 
viewed from the negative side of the listener reaction spectrum, which 
has been the predominate focus of the Justices when describing how 
“secondary effects” differ from “primary” or “direct” effects.251 
It is possible to describe the speech content provocation of all of 
the effects accepted by the Court as “secondary” in ways that divorce 
the effects from listener reactions of “dislike,” “offense,” or “psychic 
harm.”  The effect of “crime” occurs either because erotic 
entertainment speakers or viewers are perpetrators or victims. 
Whatever the particular combination, one of the actors engaged in the 
conduct was attracted to or reacting consistently with the sexually-
248. Minimum-distance, no-touch, and opening-viewing requirements address patron
behaviors of touching performers or service staff, or engaging in sex acts in closed booths 
while viewing erotic performances.  See supra note 247.  
 249. See SECONDARY EFFECTS 
RESEARCH,https://web.archive.org/web/20170316033750/http://www.secondaryeffectsresea
rch.com/biblio. 
250. See discussion supra Part II.A.
251. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)  (secondary 
effects are distinct from “suppress[ing] the expression of unpopular views”); City of L.A. v. 
Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440 (2002)  (a purpose to reduce secondary effects 
shows ordinances will not be used “to discriminate against unpopular speech” (citing City of 
Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 298–99 (2000)); id. at 458 (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(secondary effects must be “distinct from disagreement”); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, 
Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.34 (the justification in Erznoznik, which led to strict scrutiny, was 
“protecting [] citizens from exposure to unwanted, ‘offensive’ speech” (citing Erzoznik v. 
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214–15 (1975)); id. at 83, 84 (Powell, J., concurring) (“offense” 
justification “directly [] regulate[s the] content of expression”).  
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stimulating content of the speech.  This is evidently true with sex 
crimes, but is true of non-sex crimes as well, since perpetrators prey on 
patrons who are attracted to or distracted by the content of the 
speech.252  So, the many particular effects that comprise the general 
secondary effect of “crime” can plausibly be understood as “unrelated” 
to negative viewer reactions to the content of erotic entertainment.  The 
same is true of negative public health effects, which are another type of 
commonly listed secondary effect.  People engage in the conducts that 
produce negative public health effects, such as sex acts and drug use, 
because they are attracted to or reacting consistently with the content of 
the speech. 
The other major group of secondary effects—declining property 
values, reduced “quality of life,” and blight—could trace to public 
offense at the content of erotic speech.  It is difficult to pinpoint 
precisely why residents, customers or business owners avoid areas with 
sexually-oriented business.  It could be distaste for the content of the 
speech or for the conduct that the speech, in one way or another, 
provokes.  Likely both types of reactions are involved, at least to some 
extent.  It is plausible, however, to understand these effects as 
provoked primarily by public offense at the conduct that occurs in the 
vicinity of sexually-oriented businesses—crimes and activities that 
adversely affect public health and safety.  Understood in this way, the 
public reaction that underpins the “blight” effects traces to offense at 
conduct, not speech content, and to the extent that the conduct is rooted 
in some viewers’ reactions to speech content, those reactions are 
sympathetic, rather than negative.  So, viewed from a perspective 
generous to the regulator, secondary effects that could be the result of 
public offense at the content of erotic speech could alternatively be the 
result of public offense at the conduct of people who are attracted to 
the speech or reacting consistently with its messaging.253  This does not 
252. McCord & Tewksbury, supra note 244, at 1112 (“[T]he suitability of SOB patrons
as potential crime victims is due to the fact that SOB patrons are disproportionately male, 
open to vice overtures, and carry cash. Most important of all, when victimized, they are 
reluctant to involve the police. From the offender’s perspective, they are ‘perfect’ victims.”). 
253. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 586 (1991)  (Souter, J., concurring)
(citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)) (adopting himself 
and describing the Court in Renton as having adopted a generous view of the possible causal 
relationships between erotic entertainment and secondary effects, under which there was no 
“need to decide” the precise reason for the correlation between the two); Giovani Carandola, 
Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 515 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e conclude that one purpose of [the 
challenged regulations]  is to address the secondary effects that follow from lewd conduct on 
licensed premises, and that hostility to erotic expression, if a purpose of the restrictions at 
all, does not constitute the predominant purpose.”).  
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remove the free speech problem, but it relocates it.254  The question 
becomes whether it is possible to define a constitutionally principled 
category of secondary effects, while still acknowledging that they trace 
to sympathetic reactions to the content of the speech.  
III. MAKING SENSE OF SECONDARY EFFECTS
Secondary Effects Analysis will always be an odd fit within a Free 
Speech Clause framework that equates a content classification on the 
face of a regulation with a government purpose to censor speech.255  
Despite implications by the Justices that the “secondary” nature of the 
effects targeted by a regulation divorces them from the “direct” impact 
of the speech on its audience, a connection between attraction or 
reaction to the speech content and the effects does, and must, exist. 
Something other than a neat division between the effects and the 
content of the speech exchange must explain the unanimous hunch 
among the Justices that deferential review of some class of regulations 
imposed on sexually-oriented businesses is appropriate.256  Secondary 
Effects Analysis began with a messy listing of factors that justified 
deferential review of the erotic entertainment zoning law at issue257 
and, to be transparent and explanatory, it is to a more complicated 
combination of considerations that the Court has yet explicated that a 
principled justification must return.  Unearthing the unstated attributes 
of the “secondary effects” that prompt the move into deferential 
Secondary Effects Analysis can make some sense of the label and 
locate the analysis within established Free Speech Clause doctrine. 
254. That is, there may be a constitutionally significant difference between a “heckler’s 
veto” and a “thieve’s veto.”  See New Albany DVD, LLC v. City of New Albany, Ind., 581 
F.3d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 978 (2010).
255. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015) (“[S]trict scrutiny applies
. . .  when a law is content based on its face”); Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 440 (“We are 
also guided by the fact that Renton requires that municipal ordinances receive only 
intermediate scrutiny if they are content neutral [because they are aimed at reducing 
secondary effects].” . . .  There is less reason to be concerned that municipalities will use 
these ordinances to discriminate against unpopular speech.”); Id. at 449 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“[Z]oning regulations do not automatically raise the specter of impermissible 
content discrimination, even if they are content based, because they have a prima facie 
legitimate purpose: to limit the negative externalities of land use.”). 
256. In Alameda Books, all nine justices joined opinions applying secondary effects
analysis.  City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 426–44 (2002) (O’Connor, J., 
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and Thomas, J.J., for the plurality); id. at 444–53 
(Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 453–66  (Souter, J., joined by Stevens and Ginsburg, J.J., 
dissenting, and Breyer, J., dissenting in part). 
257. Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (plurality opinion); id. at 73
(Powell, J., concurring). 
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A. Caused (In Part) by Positive Listener Reactions to Speech Content
Although it is possible to divorce secondary effects from listeners’
negative reactions to erotic entertainment, it is not possible to eliminate 
entirely the causal link between the effects and the content of the 
speech.  Most types of secondary effects of sexually-oriented 
businesses trace to human actions provoked to some extent by the 
content of the speech.  If the provocation cannot constitutionally be 
dislike of the speech, it must be some type of positive attitude toward 
it.  Most of these behaviors result either from the proclivities of 
viewers attracted to the speech or the reactions of viewers to the 
speech.  These include the direct public health effects of unsanitary 
conditions and the spread of disease, and of sex crimes provoked by the 
sexual stimulation of the speech.  These also include the less direct 
effects of crimes perpetrated against erotic entertainment patrons, and 
the property degradation effects that follow from the increased number 
of crimes and concentration of criminals.  All of these qualify as 
secondary effects that provoke deferential review yet, viewed most 
generously to the regulator, all of them originate with positive listener 
responses to the content of the speech.  It must be that this causal link 
between speech and effects that trace to positive viewer responses does 
not raise the same level of suspicion of unconstitutional censorship as 
effects that stem from viewer offense.258  
Regulating to reduce the direct, psychic effect of speech on 
listeners raises a suspicion of unconstitutional censorship whether that 
effect is negative or positive.  The government may not restrict 
offensive speech even when the purpose is to reduce negative listener 
reactions that are so severe as to be psychologically or physically 
harmful.259  And, absent a direct connection to regulable conduct, 
restricting willing listeners’ access to speech to prevent the positive or 
persuasive effect it may have upon them, is unconstitutional “thought 
258. Cf. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 447 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that it is the
zoning context that makes an “inference of impermissible discrimination [] not strong”). 
259. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 448, 454–55 (2011) (First Amendment fully
protected the right of members of the Westboro Baptist Church to picket the funeral of a 
serviceman who was killed in action, even though the church’s signs bore deliberately 
offensive messages such as “Thank God for Dead Soldiers” and “Thank God for IEDs,” 
because protest was of public, rather than private, concern); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. 
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (Televangelist, a public figure, could not be awarded 
damages for a clearly-labeled parody advertisement that caused him offense, embarrassment 
and distress but neither held itself out as fact nor damaged his reputation); Nat’l Socialist 
Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43–44 (1977) (per curiam) (the Supreme Court 
of Illinois must allow a stay of a lower court order prohibiting Illinois Nazis from marching 
in uniform, distributing pamphlets or displaying materials “which incite or promote hatred” 
against Jews or others). 
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control.”260  In fact, when the government regulates speech to prevent 
its direct, psychic impact, the goals of preventing both negative and 
positive listener reactions may be present.  That is, the regulating 
public may want to avoid contact with the speech because it finds it 
offensive and also want to restrict the access of others to the speech out 
of concern that they will find it persuasive.  The Court has found both 
of these interests to be present, and to support restriction of sex speech 
that qualifies as obscenity.261  When sex speech does not qualify as 
obscenity, neither of these interests supports regulation and either 
purpose translates to unconstitutional censorship.262 
Regulating to prevent the conduct that listeners may engage in 
because they are offended or convinced by the content of the speech 
raises somewhat different constitutional concerns.  The Constitution 
requires strict review of, and generally does not permit, government 
regulations aimed at reducing negative effects perpetrated by listeners 
hostile to a speaker.263  Implementing the offense of a hostile audience 
260. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1985)
(ordinance which sought to restrict pornography that showed women in subordinate or 
submissive positions and was designed to prevent the perception of women as servile struck 
down as content-based restriction), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001, and reh’g denied, 475 U.S. 1132 
(1986). 
261. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57–61 (1973) (rejecting, on the basis
of a lowering of the tone of society, the argument that there is no reason to regulate obscene 
material consumed by consenting adults even though “there are no scientific data which 
conclusively demonstrate that exposure to obscene material adversely affects men and 
women or their society.  . . .  Although there is no conclusive proof of a connection between 
antisocial behavior and obscene material, the legislature [] could quite reasonably determine 
that such a connection does or might exist.”). 
262. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 253–54 (2002) (striking down as
overbroad federal law making distribution and possession of virtual child pornography a 
felony; when there were no children involved in the production of the materials, there is no 
reason to classify it as obscene, or to justify a ban on the grounds that even virtual depictions 
of children can cause harm to real children; “[t]here is here no attempt, incitement, 
solicitation or conspiracy.  The Government has shown no more than a remote connection 
between speech that might encourage thoughts or impulses and any resulting child abuse.  
Without a significantly stronger, more direct connection, the Government may not prohibit 
speech on the ground that it may encourage pedophiles to engage in illegal conduct”); 
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969) (“Georgia asserts that exposure to obscene 
materials may lead to deviant sexual behavior or crimes of sexual violence.  There appears 
to be little empirical basis for that assertion”); Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 
1188, 1199 (9th Cir. 1989) (plaintiffs showed no direct evidence that the “expressive 
activity [of] non-obscene ‘pornography’ ” led to rape, murder, or brutalization of women). 
263. “Heckler's veto” occurs when the public expression of ideas is “prohibited merely
because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of the hearers, or simply because 
bystanders object to peaceful and orderly demonstrations.” Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 
564, 567 (1970)  (citations omitted); see also Forsyth Cnty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 
505 U.S. 123, 134–35, 135 n.12 (1992) (County could not base its fee for a parade or 
speaking permit on the anticipated reaction to the speech or expression; “[s]peech cannot be 
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by force of law signals government censorship of the speaker’s 
message, and likely has the effect of majority speech values silencing 
disliked minority speakers.  These rules stem from political protests in 
public forums, but the principles apply in other contexts.264  The 
category of obscenity defines the extent to which public offense can be 
the basis for restricting sexually-explicit speech, and so regulating 
speech to reduce effects caused by listener offense to sex speech that is 
not obscene would constitute an end-run around the delimited category. 
By contrast, the Constitution does not prohibit the government 
from restricting speech because listeners may be convinced by it to 
engage in regulable conduct.  In fact, where direct persuasion by a 
speaker to action by a listener is present, the free speech guarantee does 
not protect the speech from restriction or the speaker from 
punishment.265  In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court held that a 
government may criminalize speech that is “directed to produce 
imminent unlawful action and likely to produce it.”266  Where the three 
elements of the incitement test coexist, criminalizing persuasive speech 
is not unconstitutional censorship of ideas because the means are 
narrowly tailored to the government’s purpose to avoid harmful listener 
conduct.  Crucial to the government’s ability to restrict the speech 
because of the conduct is that the speaker intend to incite it.  Numerous 
lower courts have found the intent requirement to protect media 
defendants from tort liability for speech products that provoke readers 
or viewers to do harmful things.267   
financially burdened, any more than it can be punished or banned, simply because it might 
offend a hostile mob”); Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t., 533 
F.3d 780, 787–88, 788 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008) (Anti-abortion group that parked truck on public
street outside school showing pictures of aborted fetuses could not be prosecuted under
criminal statute prohibiting disruptive conduct on school grounds when any disruptive
conduct occurred due to students’ reactions to group’s message; “the government cannot
silence messages simply because they cause discomfort, fear, or even anger”), cert. denied, 
555 U.S. 1098 (2009).
264. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386, 391 (1992) (ordinance prohibiting
display of symbols that “arouse[] anger, alarm or resentment in others” facially 
unconstitutional; Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (mere offense is 
not sufficient to regulate non-defamatory, non-obscene speech). 
265. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969) (drawing a distinction between
mere advocacy of violence, which is protected speech, and “incitement to imminent lawless 
action,” which is not). 
266. Id. at 447.
267. James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 698–99 (6th Cir. 2002) (producers of
violent video games and movie with violent scenes could not be held liable for violent acts 
perpetrated by teenager who opened fire in his high school, killing several; it could neither 
be said that the makers of the videos and games intended to incite violence nor that the link 
between the killer’s consumption of the media and his violent actions showed that any threat 
of harm was either imminent or likely), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1159 (2003); Herceg v. 
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To the extent that erotic entertainment meets the requirements of 
the incitement category, because, for example, it constitutes persuasion 
to engage in prostitution, government regulators can restrict it 
entirely.268  But the erotic entertainment regulated under secondary 
effects reasoning lacks a provable intent to incite viewers to engage in 
regulable behavior.  Although sexually-oriented businesses must 
acknowledge that they intend their speech products to incite sexual 
stimulation, this is not the same as intending to incite regulable sex 
acts.269  Under the incitement standard, this difference in shades of 
speaker intent is critical.270 
The incitement standard developed in the context of absolute 
criminal prohibitions imposed on speakers because the content of their 
speech persuades listeners to engage in unlawful conduct.  Secondary 
Effects Analysis applies in the context of time, place, or manner 
regulations imposed on speakers at least in part because the content of 
their speech attracts listeners who tend to engage in or provoke 
antisocial conduct.  As explained above, a presumption of 
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1022–23 (5th Cir. 1987) (plaintiffs argued that 
Hustler Magazine's article discussing the practice of autoerotic asphyxia incited a fourteen-
year-old adolescent to attempt the practice, which resulted in his death; even if the article 
painted the practice “in glowing terms . . . no fair reading of it can make its content 
advocacy, let alone incitement to engage in the practice”); Walt Disney Prods. Inc. v. 
Shannon, 276 S.E.2d 580, 582–83, 583 n.3 (Ga. 1981) (claim that “The Mickey Mouse 
Club” was a “pied piper” that provided an invitation to children to do something posing a 
foreseeable risk of injury). 
268. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (government may criminalize offers
to sell child pornography, including digital child pornography). 
269. In Barnes, Justice Souter has a conversation with the dissenters about the link
between secondary effects and what they both termed the persuasive effect of the erotic 
speech.  Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 585–86 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring); 
id. at 592–93, 593 n.2 (White, J., dissenting).  Justice Souter’s explanation was not 
convincing, and the dissent pointed that out.  Id. at 585–86 (Souter, J., concurring) (“To say 
that pernicious secondary effects are associated with nude dancing establishments is not 
necessarily to say that such effects result from the persuasive effect of the expression 
inherent in nude dancing.  It is to say, rather, only that the effects are correlated with the 
existence of such establishments offering such dancing, without deciding what the precise 
causes of the correlation actually are.”); Id. at 593 n.2 (White, J., dissenting) (“If Justice 
Souter is correct that there is no causal connection between the message conveyed by the 
nude dancing at issue here and the negative secondary effects that the State desires to 
regulate, the State does not have even a rational basis for its absolute prohibition on nude 
dancing that is admittedly expressive.”).  But the dissent presumed that crimes like 
prostitution and sexual assault were the result of the constitutionally significant persuasive 
effect of the speech.  Id. at 592.  This is not correct.  The message is, “Get sexually 
stimulated.”  It is not “Go hire a prostitute” or “Let your guard down so you become an easy 
crime victim.” 
270. Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959)
(film does not meet incitement standard when it “advocates [the] idea…that adultery under 
certain circumstances may be proper behavior”). 
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unconstitutional censorship attaches to government regulations aimed 
at reducing conduct listeners engage in because they find speech 
content offensive.  More leeway exists, however, for regulators to 
burden speech because listeners find it attractive.  Even in a public 
forum, speakers can incur additional burdens because of the number of 
people they attract and the public cost of reducing the harms they 
present.271  Although the rule is neutral, in application, the burdens 
imposed by the rule will rise with the popularity of the speech.272  This 
means that speakers may be required to bear the public costs of 
ensuring that their speech may be presented safely and effectively to a 
willing audience.  It is true that imposing regulatory burdens on 
sexually-oriented businesses to avoid conduct caused by the traits and 
reactions of willing listeners, rather than only their number, links more 
to the content of the speech.  Nevertheless, security firms and localities 
presume that taking precautionary measures based on the anticipated 
demographics and proclivities of the audience is basic prudent crowd 
control to assist public safety.273  There is some indication that 
271. MacDonald v. City of Chi., 243 F.3d 1021, 10231 (7th Cir. 2001) (interpreting
Supreme Court precedent to uphold fees on speakers to deal with traffic), cert. denied, 534 
U.S. 1113 (2002); Brandt v. Vill. of Winnetka, No. 06 C 588, 2007 WL 844676 (N.D. Ill. 
Mar. 15, 2007) (same); see also FEMA, SPECIAL EVENTS CONTINGENCY PLANNING: JOB 
AIDS MANUAL 22 (2005), 
http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/downloads/is15aspecialeventplanning-jamanual.pdf.  
“Most public sector agencies have adopted a “User Pays” policy for services provided at 
sporting and entertainment events.  The purpose of this policy is to improve the allocation of 
statute resources in the general community by providing a means of charging for services 
deployed to plan for, and respond to, sporting and entertainment events.  Event promoters 
should consult local and State authorities to determine relevant fee structures and charges 
for services provided, including payment of overtime costs for personnel.  Promoters may be 
required to post a bond or provide liability insurance to cover the costs of response to 
emergencies, subsequent venue cleanup, traffic and crowd control, and other policing 
functions.” 
272. ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY ON THE USE OF GRAND TRAVERSE COUNTY PROPERTY
FOR A PUBLIC EVENT, DEMONSTRATION OR DISPLAY (Aug. 19, 2013), 
http://www.co.grand-traverse.mi.us/DocumentCenter/View/47.  “Any and all areas affected 
by the event, demonstration or display shall be cleaned and returned to its original condition 
which existed prior to the event. Requestor must agree to pay any damages or clean-up costs 
incurred by the County as a result of the event.”; Santa Clara County Parks, Addendum to 
Park use Permit Conditions for Special Events (April 2015), 
https://www.sccgov.org/sites/parks/AboutUs/Documents/addendum-special-event.pdf 
(special event permit fee goes up with the number of expected participants).  
273. Ralph Witherspoon, Security for Bars, Taverns, Lounges and Nightclubs, 
WITHERSPOON SECURITY CONSULTING (Jan. 31, 2013) http://www.security-
expert.org/nightclubs.htm (“A key factor [in determining security risks and needs] is 
knowing your guests/patrons – who you are attracting”); TAMARA D. MADENSEN & JOHN E. 
ECK, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST.: OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES, GUIDE NO. 54, 
SPECTATOR VIOLENCE IN STADIUMS at 42 (Aug. 2008), 
http://www.popcenter.org/problems/pdfs/spectator_violence.  (ways to reduce situational 
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imposing permit requirements based on listener proclivities is 
acceptable even with political speech in a public forum.274  These rules 
suggest that in some instances where willing listeners are the source of 
the regulable conduct, speakers who reach out to attract these listeners 
may be subject to regulations designed to limit the public damage that 
the listeners may do, consistent with the Constitution’s free speech 
guarantee.275   
Although the Court has not explicitly suggested this attribute of 
secondary effects, it is consistent with descriptions the Justices have 
offered of why deferential review is appropriate and, embracing it 
rather than ignoring it, helps make sense of Secondary Effects 
Analysis.  A direction to verify that the “effects” on the expanding lists 
relied upon by regulators as “secondary” do not trace to public dislike 
of the content of the expression is implicit in the Court’s direction that 
courts verify that the predominate concerns motivating a regulation 
“‘[are] with the secondary effects of adult [speech], and not with the 
content of adult [speech].’ ” 276  Courts currently verify that regulators 
are motivated to reduce concrete effects and not by outright or 
acknowledged offense at the content of erotic entertainment.277  
Understanding that secondary effects must trace to the content of 
speech and that the forbidden causal connection is between negative 
listener reactions and regulable conduct allows courts to take the 
second part of the Court’s direction seriously, and verify that effects 
listed by regulators properly qualify as secondary effects that lead to 
deferential analysis.  As noted above, most negative effects, old or 
instigators of violence include reducing heat and noise levels, trading t-shirts bearing 
obscene messages for those with socially acceptable messages, and prohibiting bands from 
playing songs that encourage the audience to shout vulgarities); Roman Wolfe, Security 
Measures Upped for Snoop Show; Gang Violence Feared, ALLHIPHOP (May 7, 2008), 
http://allhiphop.com/2008/05/07/security-measures-upped-for-snoop-show-gang-violence-
feared/  (measures agreed to by the promoter included a ban on firearms in the venue, metal 
detectors, and extra security searches of the performer, his entourage, and vehicles). 
274. Potts v. City of Lafayette, Ind., 121 F.3d 1106, 1111–12 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding
special weapons screening at KKK rally, which included tape recorders). 
275. Church v. City of St. Michael, Civil No. 15-1575 (DWF/JSM), 2016 WL 4545310,
at *15 (D. Minn. Aug. 31, 2016)  (upholding different zoning of churches based, in part, on 
safety concerns caused by “traffic generated by an assembly with a single start time”); Yvon 
v. City of Oceanside, Case No. 16-CV-1640-AJB-WVG, 2016 WL 4238539, at *4 (S.D.
Cal. Aug. 11, 2016) (quoting zoning regulation that treat uses differently “because of certain
factors such as nature of operation, type of clientele, and hours-of-operation, [which] create
conditions harmful to the public health, welfare, and safety”).
276. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 441 (2002) (emphasis added).
277. Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 515 (4th Cir. 2002) (verifying that
hostility to erotic expression was not the predominant purpose for a sexually oriented 
business regulation). 
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new, can reasonably be understood to trace to the broad category of 
“crime,” so this verification should not be difficult.  But the question 
should at least be asked and answered to lend legitimacy to the 
analysis. 
 Additionally, acknowledging the required connection between the 
content of erotic entertainment and secondary effects would allow 
courts more transparently to look into the other side of the pretext 
question, which is whether the alleged negative effects trace to the 
speech content at all.278  That is, not only may secondary effects trace 
to positive responses to the speech content but, if a regulation classifies 
sexually-oriented businesses for treatment different from other speech 
vendors, such a causal link must exist.  Ideally, courts would verify this 
connection as a precondition to entering Secondary Effects Analysis.279  
Currently, courts intermittently ask versions of the question as part of 
the substantive review.  The Court has noted a regulation should be 
drawn to affect “only that category of [adult business] shown to 
produce the unwanted secondary effects.”280  Lower courts have 
inquired into the other side, finding that a regulator’s failure to isolate 
negative effects to erotic entertainment businesses, when such 
businesses are singled out for restriction, can be fatal as well.281   
Most regulations will survive this inquiry, which is not rigorous as 
an initial matter or as part of the substantive review.  In some cases at 
the edges, however, this inquiry can more clearly identify the 
constitutional defect with a regulation.  For example, in Annex Books v. 
City of Indianapolis,282 the court invalidated a regulation that required 
278. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986) (power to zone
cannot be used as a “pretext for suppressing expression”) (quoting Young v. Am. Mini 
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 84 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)); Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 
447 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (if an ordinance is directed at reducing secondary effects, 
Court should not presume it to be a “covert attack on speech”). 
279. The inquiry whether alleged secondary effects plausibly trace to positive responses
to the content of the speech is different than the initial requirement to produce evidence 
showing that the means employed by the regulator will reduce them, proposed by the dissent 
in Alameda Books and rejected by the Court. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 457 (Souter, J., 
dissenting); id. at 439–40 (plurality opinion).   
280. Renton, 475 U.S. at 52.
281. Showtime Entm’t, LLC v. Town of Mendon, 769 F.3d 61, 73 (1st Cir. 2014) (when
“secondary effects flow in equal measure from other businesses, which nonetheless are left 
untouched by the regulation in question, it stands to reason that such underinclusiveness 
raises questions as to whether the proffered interest is truly forwarded by the regulation, or 
is in fact substantial enough to warrant such regulation”); Annex Books, Inc. v. City of 
Indianapolis, Ind., 740 F.3d 1136, 1137 (7th Cir. 2014)  ( “[A]dults may decide for 
themselves what risks to run by the literature they choose, and cities must protect readers 
from robbers rather than reduce risks by closing bookstores.”). 
282. Annex Books, 740 F.3d at 1136. 
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adult bookstores to close between midnight and 10 a.m. every day and 
all day on Sundays.  Obviously frustrated with a flimsy justification, 
the court reasoned that “the Supreme Court has not endorsed an 
approach under which governments can close bookstores in order to 
reduce crime directed against businesses that knowingly accept the risk 
of being robbed, or persons who voluntarily frequent their premises.”283  
But this conclusion is not correct.  Governments may regulate to 
protect people against their own decisions to assume risks.284  Many of 
the secondary effects accepted by the Court flow from risky decisions. 
 The problem with the justification is that the negative effect of 
armed robberies does not plausibly appear to be provoked by positive 
responses to the content of the expression to the minimal extent 
required to dispel the inference that public distaste for the content of 
the expression is the cause.  Although armed robbery is certainly a 
crime, it is not the type of persistent, ambient, vice-related crime that 
has been widely documented to occur in the vicinity of erotic 
entertainment businesses.  And, evidence presented by the regulator did 
not support a connection between patron behaviors and this type of 
crime.285  In cases such as this, acknowledging that a causal link 
between effects and speech is necessary to diffuse an inference of 
pretext, can allow courts to more clearly address it. 
B. Foreseeable, Likely, and Imminent
As noted above, businesses that sell erotic entertainment can
credibly assert that they do not intend to persuade patrons to engage in 
conduct that constitutes the secondary effects that support the 
regulations imposed upon them.  For this reason, the secondary effects 
engaged in by third parties are not sufficiently connected to the speech 
product sold by sexually-oriented businesses to fall within the 
incitement exception to the general prohibition on content-based 
speech regulation.  Significant parallels exist, however, between the 
speaker-conduct connection that justifies the complete prohibition of 
speech under the incitement exception and the connection between 
283. Id. at 1137.
284. See, e.g., Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486 (9th Cir. 1996)
(California’s mandatory motorcycle helmet law not unconstitutionally vague); City of 
Bremerton v. Spears, 949 P.2d 347, 356-58 (Wash. 1998) (Washington helmet law not 
unconstitutionally vague); Estevez v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 2d 205, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999) (Passengers have a common-law duty to mitigate damages by wearing seatbelts). 
285. The court noted this problem, but did not rely on it exclusively.  Annex Books, 740
F.3d at 1137 (“The data do not show that robberies are more likely at adult bookstores than
at other late-night retail outlets, such as liquor stores, pharmacies, and convenience stores,
that are not subject to the closing hours imposed on bookstores.”).
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erotic entertainment and secondary effects that justify lesser time, place 
and manner regulation of sexually-oriented businesses. 
 First, secondary effects are the foreseeable result of selling 
speech from a business occupying a particular physical location. 
Sexually-oriented businesses intend to use a speech product to attract 
customers with certain behavior patterns and to provoke sexual 
stimulation in those customers.  Theories explain the connection 
between the sexually-stimulating content and the secondary effects and 
studies from numerous locations and court decisions document that 
they are likely to occur.286  So, although they may not specifically 
intend to provoke regulable conduct, sexually-oriented business 
speakers can reasonably foresee that listeners will be provoked by the 
speech product they provide to engage in behavior that creates negative 
secondary effects.287 
In the contexts of criminal or tort liability for speech, 
foreseeability that the content of speech may provoke others to do harm 
is not enough to justify government action against the speaker to avoid 
listeners’ negative conduct.288  Although preventing the harm may be a 
strong government interest, the free speech concern with punishing or 
imposing monetary liability on speakers who can foresee that listeners 
may misinterpret what they say as a call to illegal action is that 
speakers may censor their potentially valuable speech entirely out of 
fear of liability.289  Thus, the speaker intent requirement helps to tailor 
application of the sanctions to prevent overbroad application to 
suppress valuable speech.  But when the speech restriction takes the 
form of time, place, or manner regulations, as it does with regulations 
aimed at reducing the negative secondary effects of selling sex speech, 
the chilling effect, at least in theory, does not operate against the 
content of the speech.  Instead, it should be that speakers change the 
time, place or manner or offering the very same speech, to avoid 
provoking negative secondary effects.290  This type of chill presents a 
286. McCord & Tewksbury, supra note 244, at 1108 (reviewing studies).
287. A significant number of sexually oriented business owners specifically intend to
provoke, promote and profit from prostitution.  COMBATING HUMAN TRAFFICKING: A 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 135 (MICHAEL J. PALMIOTTA, ED., 2014) (explaining that 
many so-called gentlemen’s clubs create a facilitating environment for prostitution within 
the business or by directing patrons to nearby motels). 
288. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969). 
289. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871–72 (1997) (“The severity of criminal sanctions
may well cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful 
words, ideas, and images.”); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (‘(t)he threat 
of sanctions may deter . . . almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions”) 
(quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
290. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 449-50 (2002) (Kennedy, J.,
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free speech danger because it limits the opportunities for speakers to 
offer their speech, but this danger is of lesser magnitude than the 
potential of content-based self-censorship of valuable speech.291  For 
this reason, foreseeability of negative secondary effects establishes a 
connection between speaker and listener conduct that may justify 
imposition of time, place or manner regulations on sexually-oriented 
businesses and tailor imposition of the regulations to circumstances in 
which speech results in harm in a way similar to the intent requirement 
for the category of incitement.
In addition to speaker intent, the incitement category requires that 
conduct produced by persuasive speech be likely to occur to justify 
restricting the speech to reduce the conduct.292   The likelihood 
requirement imposes a prospective and contextual causation inquiry, 
which tests the strength of the government’s need to restrict the speech 
because of the bad conduct its content is likely to cause, rather than 
mere disagreement with the message of the speech.293  This is a major 
hurdle in instances of both political speech and media entertainment 
because the lack of apparent incitement to produce the result reduces 
the likelihood that reasonable listeners will misinterpret the message.294  
But sexually-explicit speech, while not delivered with a provable intent 
to provoke regulable conduct, is certainly delivered with apparent 
incitement to produce sexual stimulation.  It is the sexual stimulation, 
or the anticipation of it, which provokes the listener behaviors that lead 
to regulable conduct.295  Empirical evidence exists that links the 
concurring) (“The rationale of [a potentially constitutional] ordinance must be that it will 
suppress secondary effects-and not by suppressing speech.”). 
291. This conclusion flows from the lower standard of review applied to time, place, or
manner regulations as compared to content-based regulations of speech. 
292. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448–49. 
293. “Since the uncontroverted evidence showed that Hess' statement was not directed to
any person or group of persons, it cannot be said that he was advocating, in the normal 
sense, any action.  And since there was no evidence, or rational inference from the import of 
the language, that his words were intended to produce, and likely to produce, imminent 
disorder, those words could not be punished by the State on the ground that they had "a 
‘tendency to lead to violence.’ " Hess v. State, 297 N. E.2d 413, 415 (Ind. 1973), rev’d 414 
U.S. 105 (1973). 
294. Id.  And even if some viewers misinterpret the message and commit unlawful acts,
the lack of speaker intent to persuade viewers to engage in the conduct protects the speaker 
from punishment under the incitement standard.  Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 
233, 266 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[I]n virtually every  “copycat” case, there will be lacking in the 
speech itself any basis for a permissible inference that the "speaker" intended to assist and 
facilitate the criminal conduct described or depicted.”). 
295. McCord & Tewksbury, supra note 244, at 1112 (‘[T]ypical patrons of SOBs can
easily be seen as highly suitable for victimization.  These are not individuals who are 
scanning their environment or attending to copresent others; hence, they are focused on one 
set of activities and largely unmindful and unaware to other actions in their midst.”). 
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content of sexually-stimulating entertainment to regulable content in 
the vicinity of where it is sold.296  Assuming that the evidence is 
accurate and relevant,297 it shows that negative secondary effects are 
likely to occur in the vicinity of sexually-oriented businesses.298 
Finally, the imminence requirement tests whether the bad actions 
will occur so close in time to the speech, that the government must act 
against the speaker to eliminate the conduct.  It asks whether other 
remedies, such as counterarguments or law enforcement directed at the 
perpetrators, can reduce the effects in lieu of restricting the speech.299  
Secondary effects that the Court has accepted stem from the behaviors 
that occur on or in the immediate vicinity of erotic entertainment 
businesses.  Despite existing laws and penalties, and in the presence of 
ordinary levels of law enforcement, these effects occur very close in 
time to the purchase or consumption of erotic entertainment.300  The 
persistence of these effects in the presence of law enforcement 
demonstrates the inefficacy of this alternate remedy,301 at the level of 
public resources ordinarily devoted to protect business operations.302 
296. See id. at 1110-12. 
297. Daniel R. Aaronson, Gary S. Edinger, &James S. Benjamin, The First Amendment
in Chaos: How the Law of Secondary Effects is Applied and Misapplied by the Circuit 
Courts, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 741, 754 (2009) (noting that the Court has given no clear 
guidance how to reconcile conflicting evidence about the existence of negative secondary 
effects, specifically: “What happens, for instance, when a community has actual experience 
with adult entertainment establishments operating for many years and reliable data are 
available that show conclusively-to a scientific certainty-that those businesses cause no 
unique harms in their communities?  Can foreign studies trump actual local experience 
measured with reliable statistics?  Or put in the terms of Renton analysis, can foreign studies 
and anecdotal information ever be “reasonably believed” in light of local scientific evidence 
of Daubert quality showing that the government's information is factually incorrect?”). 
298. McCord & Tewksbury, supra note 244.
299. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377-78 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“If
there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by 
the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”). 
300. McCord & Tewksbury, supra note 244, at 1112 (Secondary effects occur around
sexually oriented businesses because of the combination of motivated offenders, suitable 
targets and lack of effective guardianship.  With respect to guardianship, it is “lacking at 
SOBs as such rarely have on-site security.  Even when bouncers are present and responsible 
for social control and rule enforcement, there are strong disincentives for aggressively 
patrolling and intervening in activities that may be leading to criminal events—Strict control 
is bad for business.  In addition, SOB patrons typically arrive and leave alone [], leaving 
them without guardians in their presence.  Both property and violent offenses may be 
facilitated as well (via the absence of capable guardians) because some customers park away 
from the business to avoid having their vehicle identified causing them to have to walk 
alone to their vehicles late at night.”) (internal citations omitted). 
301. JERRY H. RATCLIFFE, INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING 106 (2008) (noting “concerns
of people in local neighborhoods can often focus on people who fly under the radar of local 
police but present a persistent nuisance”). 
302.  McCord & Tewksbury, supra note 244, at 1112 (noting that employees of
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Most secondary effects will meet the requirements that they are 
foreseeable, likely and imminent, but understanding that these 
attributes are required to lend legitimacy to the move into deferential 
scrutiny makes explicit the limit to the negative effects on the 
lengthening lists relied upon by regulators.303  The limit to secondary 
effects, and the one that must be present in the evidence relied upon by 
the regulator, is that these acts occur predictably and in close physical 
and temporal proximity to the sale of the erotic entertainment product.     
C. Generated by the Operations of Sexually-Oriented Businesses
Secondary Effects Analysis has only been applied by the Court in
the context of sex speech.  Justice Stevens, writing for the Young 
plurality, relied, in part, on a judgment that sex speech is less valuable 
than other types of fully–protected speech to apply deferential scrutiny 
to the ordinance despite the content classification evident on its face.304  
But Justice Powell and the dissenters did not agree.305  Justice Powell 
emphasized that the context of the challenge, to a commercial zoning 
ordinance, was critical to establishing the method of review.306  
Subsequent references to secondary effects have frequently added a 
qualification, consistent with Justice Powell’s concurrence, that 
secondary effects occur as the result of the operations of sexually-
oriented businesses.307  The conclusion that the lesser value of sex 
speech alone leads to less critical scrutiny is inconsistent with 
subsequent cases reviewing media and communication access 
sexually-oriented businesses hired to keep order experience “strong [financial] disincentives 
for aggressively patrolling and intervening in activities that may be leading to criminal 
events”). 
303. E.g., BBL, Inc. v. City of Angola, No. 1:13-CV-76-RLM, 2014 WL 26093 at *4
(N.D. Ind. Jan. 2, 2014) (“personal and property crimes, prostitution, potential spread of 
disease, lewdness, public indecency, obscenity, illicit drug use and drug trafficking, negative 
impacts on surrounding properties, urban blight, litter, and sexual assault and exploitation”). 
304. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70–71 (1976).  Pluralities have also 
said that nude dancing “falls only with the outer ambit of the First Amendment’s 
protection.” City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (citing Barnes v. Glen 
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565–66 (1991) and Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 
60, 61 (1981)).  
305. Young, 427 U.S. at 76 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 84–85 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); id. at 96 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).. 
306. Id. at 76 (Powell, J., concurring).
307. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988) (sexually-oriented businesses are almost
unique in producing secondary effects); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 
49 (1986) (Secondary Effects Analysis appropriate “at least with respect to businesses that 
purvey sexually explicit materials”).   But see Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 
586 n.3 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring) (“protection of sexually explicit expression may be 
of lesser societal importance”); Renton, 475 U.S. at 49 n.2 (quoting Young, 427 U.S. at 70, 
stating that sex speech is of lesser social value). 
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restrictions to protect minors.308 
 So, the Court has only applied Secondary Effects Analysis in 
the more narrow context of the operation of sexually-oriented 
businesses.  These businesses exist in physical space and choose to 
produce, market, and sell their products in particular ways.  These 
businesses sell products, including speech products, which exist 
primarily for the purpose of producing sexual stimulation.  Attraction 
or reaction to this product is at the core of the chain of events that lead 
to secondary effects.309  The secondary effects are the result of the 
proclivities and behaviors of the people selling the product and the 
people consuming it.310  So, positive listener responses to the content of 
the speech in part “cause” the secondary effects.  But an important 
additional cause of the secondary effects is the facilitating environment 
set up by the sexually-oriented business to attract customers and reap 
the maximum profit from the erotic entertainment they sell.311 
The business operation context distinguishes the erotic 
entertainment subject to secondary effects regulations from speech of 
the same type offered via various forms of media.  Vendors that create 
business environments to attract customers with certain attributes prior 
to purchasing a speech product or to facilitate their misbehavior after 
consuming it bear some non-speech responsibility for causing the 
negative public health and safety effects that occur on or in the vicinity 
of the property.  This recognition does not remove the connection of 
the effects to the listeners’ reactions to the content of the speech, but it 
diffuses the connection in a way that has some constitutional 
significance.  When an Internet pornography viewer repeats a sexual 
assault he has paid to see, the causal contribution of the film producers 
308. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000) (“The statute
now before us burdens speech because of its content; it must receive strict scrutiny,” unlike 
“zoning cases” that sought to control secondary effects); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 
867–68 (1997) (Communications Decency Act could not be analyzed as time, place, or 
manner restriction because it was a content-based blanket restriction on speech and sought 
to protect children from the speech itself, not the secondary effects); Sable Commc’ns of 
Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127–28 (1989) (complete ban on indecent “dial-a-porn” 
service could not be justified by potential harm to children because it denied the 
communication to willing adults based on the content of the speech). 
309. Patrons attracted to sexually oriented businesses and who react to the sexually
stimulating speech engage in conduct that creates negative secondary effects and are 
“perfect victims” who, in turn, attract third parties who engage in conduct that creates 
negative secondary effects. McCord & Tewksbury, supra note 244, at 1112.  
310. Id. (Sexually oriented businesses provide a setting where “motivated offenders,
suitable targets, and a lack of effective guardianship converge in time and space, [which 
creates an environment where] criminal activities are likely to occur.”). 
311. Id. at 1113 (“Strict control [of criminal behavior by bouncers or other sexually
oriented business employees] is bad for business.”). 
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is speech only.312  By contrast, when a sexually-oriented business 
patron watches erotic dancing and purchases sex on-site or in the 
immediate vicinity, the sexually-oriented business’s causal contribution 
is for the speech plus the facilitating environment, both of which are 
important parts of the product it sells.  In this type of environment, 
deliberately created by the business for the purpose of generating a 
profit, the “effects” are not unexpected misinterpretations of the speech 
product, but routine, predictable by-products of doing business in a 
particular way. 
Additionally, and importantly, the operation of a regulation 
subject to Secondary Effects Analysis must be to modify the 
facilitating aspect of the environment, not just to restrict delivery of the 
speech.313  Local governments have broad discretion to regulate the 
businesses to serve the health, safety, and welfare of the community in 
which they operate.314  Businesses may also be regulated according to 
generalized category without proof that each and every business of that 
type poses the same type and level of risk of harm as the group. 
Although it is possible to argue around the edges,315 a core category of 
sexually-oriented businesses sell a combined product of sexually-
stimulating speech and facilitating environment.316  The gist of 
Secondary Effects Analysis is that the foreseeable externalities that 
result from this business decision to sell this combined product may 
justify a greater scope of regulation than externalities that result from 
the sale of speech alone.  
312. Olivia N. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981) (NBC program in which a
girl is raped with a “plumber’s helper” did not incite four youths, who raped a girl on a 
beach with a bottle shortly after viewing the episode). 
313. See discussion infra Part III.D.
314. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
315. Sexually-oriented businesses that offer erotic entertainment for off-site
consumption only can argue that they created a different, and less facilitating, environment.  
H & A Land Corp. v. City of Kennedale, 480 F.3d 336, 339 (5th Cir. 2007) (“On-site 
businesses (i.e., adult theaters or strip clubs) pose a greater threat of secondary effects than 
off-site sexually oriented businesses (i.e., adult bookstores)”); Richard McCleary & Alan C. 
Weinstein, Do “Off–Site” Adult Businesses Have Secondary Effects? Legal Doctrine, Social 
Theory, and Empirical Evidence, 31 L. & POLICY 217 (2009) (finding that patrons linger at 
off-site bookstores, which generates secondary effects). 
316. MICHAEL J. PALMIOTTO, COMBATING HUMAN TRAFFICKING: A
MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 135 (2014) (many so-called gentlemen’s clubs provide 
space for prostitution on-site or direct patrons to nearby motels); McCord & Tewksbury, 
supra note 244, at 1112 (sexually oriented businesses create a facilitating environment by 
intentionally failing to act as effective guardians against criminals). 
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D. Caused (In Part) by the Time, Place, or Manner Variable Modified
by the Regulation
From the beginning, the fact that a regulation constitutes a partial 
limit, rather than a total ban, has been a critical element to invoking 
Secondary Effects Analysis.317  This has evolved into the first 
requirement of the two-step test to enter Secondary Effects Analysis.318  
The Justices have implied that the partial restriction of a zoning 
ordinance works on its own to render the burden of the regulation on 
free speech interests “minimal.”319  They have also said that the means 
of regulation works in combination with a “content-neutral” purpose to 
reduce secondary effects to make deferential time, place, or manner 
scrutiny appropriate.320 
In his Alameda Books concurrence, Justice Kennedy explained 
most explicitly how the means of regulation and the purpose to reduce 
secondary effects must work together to qualify the regulation for 
Secondary Effects Analysis.  Justice Kennedy placed emphasis on 
identifying precisely “the claim a city must make in order to justify a 
content-based zoning ordinance.”321  This claim must be that the 
ordinance “will suppress secondary effects—and not by suppressing 
speech.”322  That is, the regulator’s rationale must be that the means of 
regulation will reduce secondary effects without significantly reducing 
the quantity of speech emanating from the speaker or listener demand 
317. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 434, 443 (2002) (noting that the 
Court of Appeals had held that the city’s prohibition was not a ban, and that issue was not 
part of respondents’ petition for review); id. at 449–50 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (in order 
for a city to justify a content-based ordinance, it “must advance some basis to show that its 
regulation has the purpose and effect of suppressing secondary effects, while leaving the 
quantity and accessibility of speech substantially intact”); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 
U.S. 277, 319–20, 320 n.2 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing Erie’s ordinance 
as a total ban on a certain type of speech and distinguishing it from the Detroit ordinance in 
Young: “[e]ssential to our holding, however, was the fact that the ordinance was ‘nothing 
more than a limitation on the place where adult films may be exhibited’ and did not limit the 
size of the market in such speech” (quoting Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 
71 (1976)); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 46, 48 (1986) (ordinance at 
issue not a complete ban, but instead a restriction on their choice of location); Schad v. 
Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 73–75 (1981) (because ordinance was a total ban on 
live entertainment and borough had not identified the municipal interests supporting a ban 
when other commercial uses were permitted, ban was not a valid time, place, or manner 
restriction); Young, 427 U.S. at 71–73, 73 n.35 (noting that the zoning requirements in 
Detroit were only applicable to new locations rather than existing ones, and that there were 
“myriad” locations within the city that met the 1,000-foot restriction).    
318. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 434. 
319. Young, 427 U.S. at 78.
320. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 434. 
321. Id. at 449 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
322. Id. at 449-50.
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for the speech.323  This is the same rationale that underpins the 
constitutionality of content-neutral time, place or manner regulations. 
Any burden imposed by the regulation may reduce the quantity of 
speech or demand for it, but because it is imposed without respect to 
the content of the speech, there is no obvious indicator of message-
motivated censorship.  With regulations imposed on sexually-oriented 
businesses, the secondary effects  result from the combination of the 
listeners’ reactions to the content of the speech and the time, place, or 
manner variable.324  Any burden imposed by the regulation will 
likewise trace to the speech content.  For this reason, the government 
must rebut the inference of content censorship in a different and less 
solid way, which is to acknowledge that listeners’ reactions to the 
speech content is one cause of the negative effects, but show that its 
aim is exclusively to reduce the other cause, which is the time, place, or 
manner variable adjusted by the regulation.   
Initially, this inquiry is a gatekeeping prerequisite to entering 
deferential Secondary Effects Analysis.  Regulators must plausibly 
assert that the secondary effects they aim to reduce are caused by the 
combination of listeners’ reactions to the content of the speech and the 
means of delivery adjusted by the regulation, and that their aim is 
exclusively to eliminate the effectiveness of the latter.  Placed as part 
of the “proposition” that regulators must assert, this is a crucial part of 
the “pretext” inquiry, which is referenced in a number of opinions 
addressing secondary effects, but not spelled out.   
Once within Secondary Effects Analysis, this proposition also 
defines the claim an erotic entertainment business must make and the 
evidence it must produce to dispute the assumptions of the regulator 
and shift the burden of proof.  Once again, the business’s focus must be 
on the nature of the secondary effects relied upon by the regulator and 
the role of the aspect of business operation regulated in producing 
them.   
One example that helps illustrate this requirement is Annex 
Books,325 mentioned above.  To reduce the negative effect of armed 
robberies at adult bookstores, the city required them to close from 
midnight to 10 a.m. every day and all day on Sunday.326  The court 
323. Id. at 445 (A regulation aimed at reducing secondary effects may be consistent with
the Constitution “if it is likely to cause a significant decrease in secondary effects and a 
trivial decrease in the quantity of speech”). 
324. John Fee, The Pornographic Secondary Effects Doctrine, 60 ALA. L. REV. 291, 332
(2009) (observing that secondary effects may arise from “multiple causal factors”). 
325. Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, Ind., 740 F.3d 1136 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 99 (2014).  
326. Id. at 1137.
448 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:57
noted the requirement from Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, and 
reasoned that the problem with the ordinance before it was with the 
form of the means.327  According to the court, “The benefits come from 
closure: shuttered shops can’t be robbed at gunpoint, and they lack 
customers who could be mugged.  If that sort of benefit were enough to 
justify closure, then a city could forbid adult bookstores altogether.”328  
This is true to a certain extent, but not entirely.  Courts have upheld all 
sorts of hours-of-operation requirements imposed on erotic 
entertainment businesses.  The problem with the ordinance before this 
court, and the one it identified more specifically in an oral argument 
hypothetical, was that the hours of required closure did not represent 
times that disproportionately aggravated the effect of armed robbery.329  
For this reason, the “proposition” offered by the regulator as an initial 
matter would have been faulty, since it could not plausibly assert that 
the armed robberies it sought to reduce were disproportionately caused 
by being open, in particular, on Sunday.  Alternatively, the regulated 
businesses could offer evidence disputing the city’s proposition and 
shift the burden of proof. 
Another example involves litigation challenging a Texas statute 
that imposed a $5 per patron tax on businesses that both offer live nude 
entertainment and serve alcohol.330  Both the trial court and the court of 
appeals majority had characterized the assessment as an invalid 
“content-based tax” because it depended for its application on a 
governmental evaluation of the content of the expression, and it 
‘singl[ed] out a specific class of First Amendment speakers’  who are 
‘conveying a message that the taxing body might consider 
undesirable.’ ” 331  The Texas Supreme Court, however, accepted the 
state’s argument that the tax law was aimed at reducing negative 
secondary effects, and not suppressing speech.332  According to the 
court, “The fee is not a tax on unpopular speech but a restriction on 
combining nude dancing, which unquestionably has secondary effects, 
with the aggravating influence of alcohol consumption.”333  That is, the 
state could reasonably believe that the means of delivering erotic 
327. Id. at 1138.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 1137.
330. Tex. Entm’t Ass’n, Inc. v. Combs, No. D-1-GN-07-004179,2008 WL 2307196
(Tex. Dist. Ct., Travis Cnty., Mar. 28, 2008); Combs v. Tex. Entm’t Ass’n, Inc., aff'd 287 
S.W.3d 852, 859 (Tex. App. 2009), rev'd, 347 S.W.3d 277 (Tex. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. 
Ct. 1146 (2012).  
331. Combs, 347 S.W.3d at279-80.
332. Combs, 347 S.W.3d at 286.
333. Id. at 287.
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entertainment – in combination with serving alcohol by the drink – 
facilitates patrons’ movement from sexual stimulation to regulable 
behaviors.  The court reasoned that the operation of the statute was to 
encourage businesses to eliminate this manner of delivery, which it 
could reasonably believe would reduce negative secondary effects and 
not speech.334 
E. Summary of the Attributes of Secondary Effects That Lead to
Deferential Secondary Effects Analysis
The first step toward the move into Secondary Effects Analysis is 
for a court to verify that, on its face, a regulation presents as a time, 
place or manner restriction on the operations of sexually-oriented 
businesses.  The speech content-sensitivity of this type of regulation on 
its face is what requires Secondary Effects Analysis, rather than the 
analysis that applies to content-neutral time, place or manner 
restrictions.  The speech content-sensitivity of time, place or manner 
regulations imposed on sexually-oriented businesses may not lead to 
strict scrutiny review because these businesses intentionally sell speech 
for the purpose of inciting sexual stimulation and tend to offer it in an 
environment that facilitates the occurrence of negative secondary 
effects, which are foreseeable, likely and imminent.  The government’s 
obvious and plausible aim to modify the aggravating effect of these 
types of business operations, rather than the content of the speech 
product, is what a court must find evident on the face of a regulation to 
justify entry into deferential Secondary Effects Analysis. 
The next step is for a court to confirm that the restrictions imposed 
are aimed at reducing negative secondary effects, which are of the type 
that can justify the move away from strict scrutiny.  Although the Court 
has seemed to assume that the negative secondary effects of sexually-
oriented businesses that justify targeting them for regulation can be 
“unrelated to the impact of the speech on the listener,”335 what it must 
mean is that negative secondary effects that rebut an inference of 
censorship are unrelated to the negative impact of the speech on the 
334. Id. at 288 (“[T]he fee provides some disincentive to present live nude entertainment
where alcohol is consumed”).  See also Ben’s Bar, Inc. v. Vill. of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 
726 (7th Cir. 2003) (“This is not a restriction on erotic expression, but a prohibition of 
nonexpressive conduct (i.e., serving and consuming alcohol) during the presentation of 
expressive conduct.”); Sammy’s of Mobile, Ltd. v. City of Mobile, 140 F.3d 993, 999 (11th 
Cir. 1998) (“[W]e are unaware of any constitutional right to drink while watching nude 
dancing”). 
335. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 434, 444 (2002) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S.312, 320 (1988) (secondary effects “happen to be 
associated” with the content of sex speech). 
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listener.336  To confirm that the move into Secondary Effects Analysis 
is appropriate, courts must verify that the secondary effects relied upon, 
and likely recited on the face of the regulation, plausibly trace to 
attributes or behaviors of willing listeners.  Secondary effects must be 
caused in part by the responses of willing listeners to the speech 
content, but must be facilitated by the means of operation modified by 
the regulation.  Once again, the crucial condition to applying 
Secondary Effects Analysis is that the terms of the regulation make 
plausible the regulator’s assertion that its purpose is to adjust the 
contributing variable, not the content of the speech.337 
CONCLUSION 
Like it or not, Secondary Effects Analysis almost certainly will 
survive the Court’s strong statements in Reed v. Town of Gilbert.338  If 
it is here to stay, then it is all the more urgent that its place in Free 
Speech Clause doctrine and link to constitutional principles be 
explained.  The determination that a regulation is aimed at reducing the 
negative secondary effects of erotic entertainment is crucial to moving 
a facially content-based regulation out of strict scrutiny.  But the 
Justices’ abstract comments about secondary effects being “unrelated 
to the impact of speech on the audience” do not help regulators to write 
rules or lower courts to decide real cases.339  Avoiding the core 
question of why negative effects that obviously must be caused in part 
by listeners’ responses to the content of the expression nevertheless are 
“secondary” is not an acceptable strategy of constitutional 
interpretation.  Both proponents and critics of Secondary Effects 
Analysis have something to gain from acknowledging the inevitable 
connection between listeners’ reactions to speech content and 
“secondary” effects.  Proponents gain the legitimacy that Secondary 
Effects Analysis lacks currently.  Critics gain the clarity and limits that 
come with a principled grounding.  The primary concern of critics—
that a doctrine that allows for deferential review of regulations that 
336. See discussion, supra Part II.A.
337. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 46, 47 (1986) (“The ordinance
by its terms is designed to prevent [negative secondary effects],” not to suppress the 
expression of unpopular views. . . . As Justice Powell observed in American Mini Theatres, 
“[i]f [the city] had been concerned with restricting the message purveyed by adult theaters, it 
would have tried to close them or restrict their number rather than circumscribe their choice 
as to location.”) (quoting Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 82 n.4 (1976) 
(emphasis added). 
338. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S.Ct. 2218 (2015).
339. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 444 (2002) (Kennedy, J.
concurring). 
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classify speech according to its content leaves room for pretextual 
justifications340—cannot be entirely satisfied.  Nevertheless, a 
transparent understanding of the connection between speech content 
and secondary effects locates, hones, and potentially strengthens the 
pretext inquiry.  Additionally, acknowledging and explaining the 
circumstances in which Secondary Effects Analysis applies also 
identifies the opposite—when it does not—and thereby prevents its 
seepage into areas where it does not belong. 
340. David Hudson, The Secondary Effects Doctrine: “The Evisceration of First
Amendment Freedoms,” 37 WASHBURN L. J. 55, 93 (1997) (“The net effect of the secondary 
effects doctrine is to allow an easy path to censorship.”). 
